The Rise of Performance-Based Accountability in Education in the United States: 1965-1994 by Al-Turk, Akram
 
  
THE RISE OF PERFORMANCE-BASED ACCOUNTABILITY IN EDUCATION IN THE 










A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 

























































Akram Al-Turk: The Rise of Performance-Based Accountability in Education in the United 
States: 1965-1994 
(Under the direction of Kenneth Andrews) 
 
In this dissertation, I explain how the predominant concern among reformers and 
policymakers in education policy in the United States shifted from one focused on inequitable 
access in the 1960s to one focused on higher expectations of students and better standards in the 
1980s and 1990s. I explain how this new paradigm emerged and became codified into law by 
focusing on three questions. First, how do knowledge regimes shape the emergence of a new 
paradigm? I draw on government documents, data on changes in academia, and text analysis of 
academic research to advance an argument about how policies, government agencies, and 
academics drive the demand for and supply of new ideas that shape new paradigms.  
The second question I ask in this dissertation helps explain how the new paradigm would 
eventually lead to major policy changes in education. In short, what explains the growth in the 
number of interest groups in the United States, not just in education policy but more broadly? In 
the third chapter, I test the effects that four sets of explanations (resource mobilization, policy 
changes, political partisanship, and issue salience) have on the growth of interest groups. I find 
that high partisanship on an issue is consistently associated with interest group growth.  
In chapter four, I focus on two dominant paradigms in American politics—equality and 
effectiveness— and I analyze the text of public laws to assess the effect that each of the two 
paradigms has on major legislation. Using word embedding models, I find that laws that engage 
with both paradigms are likely to be major pieces of legislation. Then, using the case of 
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education policy, I find that interest groups that were best at combining and focusing on these 
two seemingly contradictory paradigms were more likely to be part of the agenda-setting process 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
On April 11, 1965, Lyndon Johnson signed into law the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act (ESEA), the first major piece of federal education legislation in the United States. 
At the signing ceremony, Johnson, in front of his old school and sitting next to one of his former 
teachers, said that ESEA would be the most important law he would sign as president. He said 
that the bill would give hope to over five million “educationally deprived” kids, provide millions 
of new books to schools, help update teaching techniques, and ease the burden of local and state 
agencies. 
The passage of ESEA was monumental for a number of reasons. First, it capped off 
decades-long efforts by education reforms, including professional associations and civil rights 
organizations, for increased federal aid to education. Increased federal funding and involvement 
in education had been proposed regularly since the mid-1940s, but political opposition—based 
on concerns over federal overreach, tying aid to desegregation efforts, and whether to provide 
funding to parochial schools—hampered previous aid efforts (Ravitch 1983). Despite failed 
efforts at major legislation for funding, education was, on the heels of the Supreme Court’s 1954 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the National Defense Education Act of 1958, and the 
1964 Civil Rights Act, increasingly becoming a national issue. 
Funding in ESEA was set aside for different education programs—library resources, 
instructional materials, supplementary education centers—but the centerpiece of the bill was 
Title I, which made up over 75 percent of the bill’s proposed funding. The funding scheme of 
Title I was an extension of an earlier aid-to-impacted-areas and would fund schools based on the 
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number of low-income children in a school district. To make it more politically feasible, 
however, the threshold was set low enough that would allow most districts in the country to 
receive Title I funding (Graham 1984:66–76). Nonetheless, the goal of the bill, passed at the 
height of LBJ’s Great Society and with very little debate in Congress, was clear: promote more 
equitable educational opportunities for American kids. 
Almost thirty-six years after the bill was passed, No Child Left Behind (NCLB), a 
reauthorization of ESEA, was passed by a 381-41 vote in the House and a 87-10 vote in the 
Senate and was signed into law by George W. Bush. While most education policy decisions were 
still made at the state level, NCLB expanded the federal government’s role in education by both 
highlighting the need for stronger standards-based reforms and requiring states to have 
performance measures, monitor their yearly progress, and sanction schools and districts if they 
underperformed (McDermott 2011:5).  
No Child Left Behind has received much attention from academics, journalists, and 
education practitioners. For many, the law was the culmination of long and ongoing efforts by 
education reformers to highlight the importance of standards and the need to hold educators and 
school districts accountable. In fact, it was not the first bill to include standards and 
accountability as a federal goal. A previous reauthorization of ESEA, 1994’s Improving 
America’s Schools Act (IASA), placed pressure on states to use accountability measures, 
although by then many states had already started doing so (Manna 2006; McDermott 2011:8). 
In this dissertation, I explain how the predominant concern among reformers and 
policymakers in education policy in the U.S. shifted from one focused on inequitable access in 
the 1960s, as exemplified in ESEA, to one focused on higher expectations of students and better 
standards, resulting in the passage of IASA. I explain how this new paradigm emerged and 
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became codified into law by focusing on three questions. First, how do knowledge regimes—
comprising both government agencies and academics—shape the emergence of a new paradigm? 
Specifically, how did education agencies and education researchers shape the standards-based 
reform efforts that emerged in full force in the early 1980s? I draw on government documents, 
data on changes in academia, and text analysis of academic research to advance an argument 
about how policies, government agencies, and academics drive the demand for and supply of 
new ideas that shape new paradigms. In chapter two of the dissertation, I find that the demand 
for new ideas was driven by the government’s funding of policy-focused and program evaluation 
studies. In conjunction, many academics in education were dissatisfied with the findings and 
methods in the field, shifting the focus of how to improve student achievement from 
socioeconomic conditions to school efficiency. The supply of new ideas was driven by education 
agencies’ increasing funding of studies of assessment and classroom instruction and by an 
increasing focus, in academia, on school curriculum and educational psychology. While 
scholarship on policy paradigms often focuses on interest groups, political elites, and public 
opinion, my findings contribute to an understanding of how knowledge regimes shape those 
paradigms. 
The second question I ask in this dissertation helps explain how the new paradigm would 
eventually lead to major policy changes in the 1990s and early 2000s. In short, what explains the 
growth in the number of interest groups in the United States, not just in education policy but 
more broadly? While scholars have proposed a number of broad theoretical explanations for this 
rise (and for determinants of collective action, more broadly), a systematic analysis of interest 
group growth in the U.S. is lacking. In the dissertation’s third chapter, I test the effects that four 
broad sets of explanations (resource mobilization, policy changes, political partisanship, and 
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issue salience) have on the growth of interest groups. My analysis spans a time period (1970-
2005) in which the number of interest groups increased threefold and in which policy changes 
are increasingly determined by the interests of these groups (Gilens and Page 2014). Using data 
broken down by policy domain (e.g., health, environment, education), I find that, in addition to 
resource mobilization, high partisanship on an issue—as measured by Congressional roll call 
votes—is consistently associated with interest group growth. These findings suggest that highly 
partisan and, therefore, competitive policy domains provide a signal to potential groups that their 
work may shape that domain. 
Finally, the third major question in this dissertation builds on the first two. Specifically, 
what roles do policy paradigms and the interest groups that communicate those paradigms play 
in shaping major legislative change? In chapter four, I focus on two dominant paradigms in 
American politics—equality and effectiveness— and I analyze the text of all public laws from 
1973 to 1994 to assess the effect that each of the two paradigms has on major legislation. Using 
word embedding models, I find that laws—especially in social policy domains—that engage 
with both paradigms are more likely to be major pieces of legislation than laws that only engage 
with one or the other. Then, using the case of education policy in the U.S., I find that interest 
groups that were best at combining and focusing on these two seemingly contradictory 
paradigms were more likely to be part of the agenda-setting process (i.e., Congressional 
hearings) in the leadup to the adoption of IASA in 1994. These organizations were also 
influential in shaping the Democratic Party’s newfound support for standards-based reforms in 
education. 
Taken together, I take a long historical perspective in this dissertation to develop a 
synthetic explanation for the emergence and eventual success of policy paradigms. In doing so, I 
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argue that the passage of major policies and the creation of policy regimes set the stage for new 
paradigms to emerge. Concurrently, major policy changes—and especially highly partisan 
issues—lead to growth in numbers of interest groups. In the case of education policy, the passage 
of ESEA in 1965 and the expanded administrative capacity of the Office of Education (and later 
the Department of Education) led to a large expansion of academic studies and ideas about “what 
works” in education, with a particular focus on how school environments and teacher 
effectiveness affect student learning. The new paradigm in education policy, focused broadly on 
effectiveness, however, did not simply replace the old paradigm that focused on equity. As I 
show in chapter four, the interest groups in education policy that were best at focusing on the 
need for effectiveness in the service of equity were the ones that had the most access to 
policymakers. And as was the case in other policy domains in American politics for the last three 
decades of the 20th century, IASA’s passage and significance was, in part, due to its focus on 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF NEW IDEAS: HOW THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT AND ACADEMICS SHAPED EDUCATION POLICY IN THE U.S., 1965-
1983 
Abstract 
How does a new policy paradigm—a coherent set of problem definitions and policy 
prescriptions—emerge? A new paradigm in education policy in the U.S. emerged in the 1980s 
that shifted the focus from inequitable access to education toward the need for effective schools 
and high standards. I draw on government documents, data on changes in academia, and text 
analysis of academic research to advance an argument about how policies, government agencies, 
and academics drive the demand for and supply of new ideas that shape new paradigms. I find 
that the demand for new ideas was driven by the government’s funding of policy-focused and 
program evaluation studies. In conjunction, many academics in education were dissatisfied with 
the findings and methods in the field, shifting the focus of how to improve student achievement 
from socioeconomic conditions to school efficiency. The supply of new ideas was driven by 
education agencies’ increasing funding of studies of assessment and classroom instruction and by 
an increasing focus, in academia, on school curriculum and educational psychology. While 
scholarship on policy paradigms often focuses on interest groups, political elites, and public 
opinion, my findings contribute to an understanding of how political institutions and knowledge 
regimes shape those paradigms.  
 
Keywords: policy paradigms; policy feedback; scientific-intellectual movements; education 






In the early 1980s, a barrage of reports lamented the state of elementary and secondary 
education in the United States. In 1981, the Southern Regional Education Board, a nonpartisan 
organization founded in the 1940s, published a report titled The Need for Quality, recommending 
better standards for teacher education, more training for school administrators, higher 
expectations of all students, and a core curriculum in schools. And within a three week period in 
the spring of 1983, no less than four major reports also called for major education reform. With 
titles such as Action for Excellence, Making the Grade, and Academic Preparation for College, 
the message was clear: K-12 students in the United States were falling behind (Toch 1991). But 
the most prominent of these reports was A Nation at Risk. Released on April 26, 1983 by the 
government-appointed Commission on Excellence in Education, this report famously stated that 
education in the United States was “being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our 
very future as a Nation and a people” (National Commission on Excellence in Education 1983). 
In particular, the report’s authors called for more rigorous academic standards and higher 
expectations of all students. 
This new policy paradigm—a relatively coherent set of problem definitions and policy 
prescriptions—stands in contrast to the broad diagnoses of problems and policy solutions in 
education that emerged in the mid-1960s. On the heels of the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the predominant concern of many 
education reformers and policymakers was inequitable access to education. Most notably, 
Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in 1965, capping a 
decades-long effort by education reformers, including professional associations and civil rights 
organizations, for increased federal aid to education. The centerpiece of ESEA was Title I, which 
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was aimed at “educationally disadvantaged” students, funding schools based on the number of 
children from low-income households in a district. The goal of the bill, passed at the height of 
LBJ’s Great Society and with very little debate in Congress, was clear: promote more equitable 
educational opportunities for American kids (Graham 1984). 
Further, Section 402 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 required that the Commissioner of 
Education report on the educational opportunities of American students, with a particular eye 
toward racial disparities. Based on analyses of the first large-scale survey of American students, 
the Equality of Educational Opportunity report was published in 1966. The authors of the 
document, commonly referred to as the Coleman report—after its lead author James Coleman—
focused on four broad topics: the degree to which schools were racially segregated; differences 
between schools on characteristics such as facilities, curriculum, and students’ socioeconomic 
backgrounds; how well students from different racial groups did on standardized tests; and the 
relationship between school characteristics and students’ socioeconomic background on 
academic achievement. Most notably, the authors argued that, while a few school characteristics 
(especially teacher quality and a racially integrated student body) mattered for academic 
achievement, schools could not overcome the “combination of nonschool factors—poverty, 
community attitudes, low educational level of parents,” especially of nonwhite students 
(Coleman et al. 1966:21). This finding set off a flurry of studies which, as I show in this chapter, 
would shape the emergence of the new policy paradigm.1 
In short, the new paradigm that emerged in the early 1980s shifted the focus away from 
socioeconomic disparities and inequitable access to education toward the need for effective 
schools, high standards, and quality education for all students. Scholars have written 
 
1 According to Google Scholar, the Coleman report was cited over 3,000 times before 1983, the year A Nation at 
Risk was published. 
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considerably about the new paradigm, especially on the ways it led to the adoption of major 
legislation in the 1990s and early 2000s, including No Child Left Behind. Some have argued that 
partisan political shifts, changes in public opinion on education, and state policymakers, rather 
than the federal government, explain the emergence and political success of the new paradigm 
(Manna 2006; McGuinn 2006). Others have argued that interest groups, especially business 
groups, and conservative thinkers were instrumental in pushing for the paradigm and for its 
effect on policy adoption (Brown 2015; Debray 2006; Toch 1991). In a different vein, Mehta 
(2013a, 2013b) argues that most explanations of the policy changes of the 1990s and 2000s pay 
insufficient attention to the paradigm itself, and he shows how the new paradigm, independent of 
other factors, considerably reshaped education politics. 
In this chapter, I sharpen the distinction between paradigm emergence and success and 
argue that the factors that led to the former differ from those that led to the latter. While the 
influence of interest groups, political elites, and shifting public opinion may have accounted for 
the policy changes of the 1990s and 2000s, these factors do not adequately explain the 
emergence of the new paradigm in the early 1980s. Instead, the new paradigm’s rise relied on 
two other factors: changes in federal policymaking—both broadly and specific to education—in 
the 1960s, and changes in the structure and content of academic research focused on education. 
Specifically, I make three main arguments in the chapter that contribute to a more general 
understanding of how political institutions and “knowledge regimes” affect the emergence of 
new policy ideas and paradigms (Campbell and Pedersen 2014).  
First, I show how the federal government, in the 1960s, began to increasingly fund 
policy-oriented research and that this kind of research was especially prominent in education 
policy in the 1960s and 1970s. The federal government was increasingly more likely to fund 
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academics and research institutes to study the effects of ESEA, assessments and higher 
standards, and teaching and learning in the classroom on students’ academic achievement. 
Second, I find that academia in the field of education was changing and that the focus in the 
field—as measured by doctorates awarded and the number of academic journals—was 
increasingly on school administration, curriculum and instruction, and educational psychology. 
And third, I find that academics—partly in reaction to the Coleman report—increasingly wanted 
to highlight the role that effective schools had on students’ academic achievement. In an effort to 
advocate for students from poor families and to show that schools could make a difference, 
academics unwittingly shifted the focus of how best to improve academic achievement away 
from socioeconomic conditions to school efficiency. 
Theoretical Framework 
The Emergence of Policy Paradigms 
Scholars have increasingly focused on the role of ideas in the policymaking process. 
Based on the view that policymaking is a “form of collective puzzlement” (Heclo 1974:305–7) 
and a conflict over problem definitions and proposed solutions, there has been renewed interest 
in the role that ideas—above and beyond electoral outcomes, interest groups, and administrative 
capacity—play in shaping policy outcomes (Béland 2005; Béland and Cox 2011; Hall 1993; 
Weir 1992). Scholars have shown that how ideas are framed and discussed, by whom, and in 
what institutional settings have an effect on policy changes—including in foreign policy and 
international affairs, macroeconomic policies, and social policies (Baumgartner, Boydstun, and 
De Boef 2008; Blyth 2002; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Hall 1989; Jones and Baumgartner 
2005; Skrentny 1996). 
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Why do some ideas and, in particular, paradigms emerge and effect policy change while 
others do not (Berman 2001; Mehta 2011)? One broad set of explanations argues that ideas win 
out when they are seen as administratively and politically viable. More specifically, ideas need 
the backing of powerful interest groups, political leaders, or political coalitions (Hall 1989; 
Kingdon 1984). A Marxist variant of this explanation relegates the independent effect of ideas, 
viewing a successful idea as mostly a reflection of the interests of powerful economic or political 
elites (Domhoff 2010).  
In contrast to interest-based explanations of the emergence or success of ideas, another 
set of explanations draws on historical institutionalism and focuses on the ways in which 
political institutions—including policies, informal norms, and bureaucratic practices—are 
constraining (Hacker and Pierson 2014). Because policy regimes and political institutions are 
viewed as relatively stable, the emergence of new and successful ideas often depends on an 
exogenous shock (e.g., war or an economic crisis) or during “critical junctures” (Capoccia and 
Kelemen 2007; McNamara 1998). A third approach argues that institutional and cultural norms 
shape political behavior and decisionmaking. In this view, organizations and political actors are 
constrained by what they perceive as possible, given institutional and cultural constraints 
(Dobbin 1994; Meyer and Rowan 1977). 
Researchers have recently highlighted two main critiques of these three broad 
explanations. The first, mostly aimed at interest-based explanations, argues that ideas do not 
simply reflect the interests of powerful political and economic elites and often have independent 
effects on policymaking (Béland 2005; Berman 1998; Blyth 2002). A second critique argues 
against a view of institutions, both political and socio-cultural, as being overly constraining. 
Ideational change, similar to other kinds of institutional change, often happens slowly and does 
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not require exogenous shocks (Mahoney and Thelen 2009). This critique opens up the possibility 
of ideational change occurring because of endogenous processes and through actors actively 
shaping policy ideas rather than simply being constrained by them (cf. Schmidt 2008, 2010).  
Researchers have also pointed to two conceptual and methodological shortcomings in the 
literature. First, scholars have noted that the concept of a policy idea itself has not been well 
conceptualized (Berman 2013; Campbell 1998, 2002). To address this, Campbell (1998) 
proposes four kinds of policy ideas—paradigms, programs, frames, and public sentiments—and 
argues that each has different effects on policymaking (cf. Hall 1993; Mehta 2011). For example, 
whereas programmatic ideas provide policymakers with clear and specific prescriptions, 
paradigms serve as background, core frameworks that constrain the range of policy solutions to 
policymakers (Campbell and Pedersen 2014:10). Researchers have shown that the factors that 
affect shifts in programmatic ideas differ from those affecting paradigmatic shifts. Whereas 
experts play an important role in shaping policy ideas, electoral politics and the search by 
policymakers for new solutions, especially during crises, play a more prominent role in shifts in 
paradigms (Campbell 2002; Hirschman and Berman 2014). Despite some headway on 
identifying the factors that affect different kinds of ideational change, more needs to be done to 
clarify the mechanisms by which ideas change (Berman 2013; Mehta 2011).  
While scholars have increasingly focused on how ideas have an independent effect on 
policymaking, a second shortcoming of the literature is that researchers have focused less 
attention on how policy ideas emerge in the first place (Campbell and Pedersen 2014). This may, 
in part, be due to conflating different parts of the policymaking process and conflating the role of 
ideas in each part of that process (Berman 2013). Two approaches have been proposed to 
alleviate this problem. The first is to view ideational change as a two-stage process. The first 
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stage is where old ideas are critiqued and jettisoned, creating demand for new ideas. The second 
stage then begins in which a new supply of ideas are proposed as alternatives (Berman 2006, 
2013; Legro 2000). The challenge for scholars is to identify the factors that contribute to changes 
in each of the two stages. Focusing specifically on the role of academics, Hirschman and Berman 
(2014) propose a similar approach, suggesting that researchers should first analyze how different 
sources of power—the relative status of academics in society, the presence of academics in 
powerful positions, and how academics push policymakers to think like they do—emerge and 
then assess the degree to which each of these affects policymaking.  
With these critiques in mind, I focus on the emergence of the new paradigm in 
education—as a two stage process—rather than its effect on policy. In line with historical 
institutionalist arguments, I explain the process by which the state and the policies it adopts 
shape what Campbell and Pederson (2014) call a knowledge regime—the field of academics and 
organizations that conduct research and produce policy ideas. To complement this analysis, I 
also show the ways academics actively shaped this knowledge regime, in turn attaining sources 
of power that would shape the new paradigm (Hirschman and Berman 2014). I now turn to two 
literatures that further inform my analysis of the case.  
Policy Feedback 
Researchers have increasingly drawn our attention to the ways policies have long-term 
effects. Policies often expand the administrative capacities of the state, and they often change the 
incentives, resources, and goals of social and political groups and give rise to new challengers 
(Goss 2013; Ingram, Jenness, and Meyer 2005; Laumann and Knoke 1987; Skocpol 1992). 
While researchers have shown that policies shape the influence of both supporters and detractors 
(Amenta, Caren, and Stobaugh 2012), policies often drive the founding of new interest groups 
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motivated to sustain or expand the policy (Campbell 2007; Day 2017). This, in part, explains 
why some have argued that soon after a policy is passed, the chance for change is relatively 
open, but that change becomes more incremental or closed off the longer a policy has been in 
place (Hacker 2002; Pierson 1993, 2004). 
Much of the policy feedback literature focuses on the ways that policies create positive 
feedback or, in other words, the ways policies produce “lock-in.” Scholars have critiqued the 
focus on positive feedback on a number of accounts. First, because policies are reinforced and, 
consequently, policy regimes are relatively stable, much of the impetus for change needs to come 
from exogenous shocks. As stated in the previous section, scholars often attribute institutional 
change to war, economic crises, or broad socio-demographic changes and pay little attention to 
endogenous processes (Clemens and Cook 1999; Howlett 2009). Second, theorists have argued 
that policies and events often set off multiple chains of events, some of which create counter-
reactions that change or even “reverse early events” (Mahoney 2000:526; cf. Haydu 1998).  
Recent work has elaborated on these critiques, showing that policies often create negative 
feedback, or self-undermining effects (Béland and Schlager 2019; Howlett 2009; Weaver 2010). 
In a recent article on the Affordable Care Act, Jacobs and Weaver (2015) suggest three types of 
self-undermining feedback, one of which is that the menu of alternatives expands, possibly 
challenging the policy. Whereas positive feedback would suggest that alternatives become less 
cognitively and politically available over time, the counterargument is that—because politicians, 
bureaucrats, experts, and the public come to expect policies to have societal benefits—policies 
often expand, rather than contract, the menu of alternative ideas. Jacobs and Weaver (2015:449) 
hypothesize three factors likely to lead to this expansion: the broad diffusion of policy expertise, 
the penetration of policy ideas in state institutions, and policy options that are seen to be credible.  
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In this chapter, I expand on the argument that policies (and institutions more generally) 
can lead to both positive and negative feedback and that the latter may outweigh the former, 
leading to institutional change (Baumgartner and Jones 2002; Béland, Rocco, and Waddan 
2019). I show how the passage of ESEA, the decisions made by bureaucrats in education 
agencies, and the broader policies of the federal government led to an expansion of alternative 
policy ideas—a type of negative feedback—that would ultimately lead to the emergence of the 
new policy paradigm in the early 1980s.   
Intellectual Movements 
If policies can expand, rather than contract, the range of alternatives, an inevitable 
question arises: how do some alternatives gain enough prominence to influence politics? Here, I 
focus on the role that intellectuals and experts play in this process. In recent years, there have 
been calls to move away from the classical approach to studying intellectuals and experts—often 
focused on their relative dependence on or autonomy from powerful interests—toward asking 
how expertise comes to be seen as legitimate and influential in the public sphere (Collins and 
Evans 2002; Eyal and Buchholz 2010; Hirschman and Berman 2014; Kurzman and Owens 
2002).  
Drawing on social movement studies, Frickel and Gross (2005) argue that the emergence 
of a scientific-intellectual movement (SIM) is a key mechanism by which ideas change and gain 
prominence.2 First, like other movements, SIMs are more likely to be successful when they have 
access to key resources—including financial support, opportunities for publishing (e.g., 
academic journals), and organizations (e.g., university departments) (Edwards, McCarthy, and 
Mataic 2018). Second, and following on Kuhn (1970), SIMs often emerge after sustained 
 
2 They propose four reasons for the emergence and success of a SIM, and I focus on two in this chapter. 
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complaints and dissatisfaction among intellectuals about the current state of research—whether 
about substance or methods (Frickel and Gross 2005).  
Researchers have argued that the emergence of the new policy paradigm in education in 
the 1980s relied, in part, on a reframing, including among intellectuals, of problem definitions 
and policy prescriptions that had been prominent in the 1960s and 1970s (Mehta 2013b; Toch 
1991). But little has been done to explain how such a broad-based movement of intellectuals 
emerged that would eventually influence the emergence of the paradigm. In this chapter, I test 
the propositions above about SIM emergence and success, in turn shedding light on the ways that 
collective actors, and competition among them, lead to institutional change (Clemens 1993; 
Lippmann 2005; Rao, Morrill, and Zald 2000).  
In summary, I draw on the ideas and politics, policy feedback, and social movements 
literatures to trace the processes by which a new policy paradigm emerges. By doing so, I 
advance the argument that ideational change in a policy domain occurs in two stages, in which 
demand for new ideas precedes an increase in the supply of ideas. Specifically, I focus on the 
ways that the state and academics drive these two stages and test for three alternative 
explanations for the emergence of the new paradigm: powerful interest groups, political elites, 
and public opinion. 
Research Design, Data, and Analytic Plan 
My goal in this chapter is to explain how a new policy paradigm in education policy in 
the early 1980s came to replace a paradigm that emerged in the mid-1960s. Because sweeping 
policy changes, including the passage of ESEA in 1965, ushered in the old paradigm, my 
analysis begins there. I focus specifically on the ways that ESEA and related government 
policies shaped a knowledge regime that would ultimately lead to the new paradigm. I 
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complement this analysis by showing how the structure and content of that knowledge regime 
was changing between the 1960s and 1980s in ways that would make it influential in the political 
sphere.  
While the new paradigm has received much academic and media attention, the case is not 
particularly unique. Put more precisely, the main cause I assess in this chapter (major policy 
changes in the 1960s) and the main effect (a new policy paradigm) are common, including in the 
U.S. context. In fact, scholars have written considerably about both the effects of Great Society 
policies and programs and about the policy paradigmatic shifts (most notably, the turn toward 
neoliberalism) that gained steam in the 1980s. Nonetheless, the precise mechanisms by which 
one caused the other are largely unexplored.3 Because education is a typical case and many 
contextual factors (e.g., bureaucratic expansion) are present in other policy areas in the U.S., it is 
an ideal case to both trace the mechanisms between cause and effect and provide general insights 
about other cases (Beach and Pedersen 2018; Falleti and Lynch 2009).  
Data and Analytic Plan 
I rely on various kinds of data in this chapter, and here I give a brief overview of the 
different data sources.4 I use the Comparative Agenda Project to provide context for the case. In 
particular, I use the project’s data on government attention to education (as measured by number 
of Congressional hearings), the federal education budget, and the budgets of other agencies and 
departments.  
 
3 A lot has been written about backlash toward Great Society programs and how this contributed to conservative 
gains, especially in the war of ideas. But this explanation largely pins this shift on changes in public opinion and the 
rise of conservative think tanks, but as I argue below, this is an inadequate explanation, especially in education 
policy. 
 
4 If needed, I provide more details in the appropriate sections below and in the appendixes. 
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I use government documents, quantitative evidence, and secondary sources to analyze 
changes in education policy (and federal policy more generally) in the 1960s and 1970s. My 
assessment of the government’s funding of research relies on Congressional hearings, the 
Congressional Record, and reports written for and by the National Research Council (NRC) and 
the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). To examine broader time trends of the government’s 
role in research, I use the National Science Foundation’s (NSF’s) Survey of Federal Funds for 
Research and Development, which provides data on funding toward R&D, by federal agency or 
department, going back to 1951.  
I assess structural changes in academia in two ways. First, I use data on the number of 
doctorates awarded by subfield, much of which is available from the Survey of Earned 
Doctorates conducted by NSF.5 Because the first year in the dataset is 1966, I use a dataset NSF 
has archived online, one that provides a more detailed breakdown of academic subfields going 
back to 1920 (National Science Foundation 2006; Thurgood, Golladay, and Hill 2006). Second, 
to assess opportunities academics in education had to publish and discuss intellectual debates in 
the field, I trace the number of academic journal foundings. To do so, I use Ulrich’s, an 
international directory of periodicals that has been in place since 1932 and whose web directory 
is updated regularly (Whitlatch and Searing 2014). I downloaded a list of all peer-reviewed, print 
journals in the United States and used Ulrich’s subject headings and start year to track journal 
foundings by field. 
To trace the evolution of content in education research from the passage of ESEA to the 
emergence of the new paradigm, I rely on both a close reading of prominent articles and debates 
in academia and analyses of a large body of academic texts. For the latter, I use the Education 
 
5 Both the Survey of Federal Funds for Research and Development and the Survey of Earned Doctorates are 
available through the WebCASPAR database (National Science Foundation n.d.) 
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Resources Information Center’s (ERIC) database. ERIC is a research repository that has been in 
place since 1964 and is currently run by the Department of Education’s Institute of Education 
Sciences. The ERIC database includes an abstract of the research report or journal article and, if 
available, the institution that wrote the article, funding sponsor, publisher, and keywords. Each 
article also includes at least one of thousands of subject indexes that government officials have 
been using since ERIC’s inception to classify education research.6 
To assess the federal government’s role in the emergence of the new paradigm, I use two 
analytic strategies. Using ERIC, I narrowed in on the most prominent subjects that pertain to 
both the old paradigm—a focus on socioeconomic conditions and unequal access to education—
and the new paradigm—the need for better standards and higher quality education.7 I then run 
logistic regression to predict the likelihood that the federal government funded a study that had 
either of those two sets of subject indexes.  
Because the coding of subject indexes in ERIC by government officials and my 
classification of those codes into two categories are subjective, my second analytic strategy relies 
on topic modeling, an inductively driven text analytic method commonly used to show the 
underlying, latent topics of large bodies of text (Blei, Ng, and Jordan 2003; McFarland et al. 
2013; Mohr and Bogdanov 2013). While researchers often use topic modeling for descriptive 
purposes, recent extensions allow a researcher to predict the likelihood that a document’s 
metadata (e.g., publication year, author, funder, etc.) are correlated with the proportion of that 
document dedicated to a particular topic (Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley n.d.). In short, I run topic 
models using the abstracts of ERIC articles and run a regression that estimates the effect of 
 
6 I compiled a dataset of all ERIC articles from the XML files made available online (Institute of Education Sciences 
n.d.).  
 
7 For a list of the subject indexes for both paradigms, see the appendix. 
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federal sponsorship on the proportion of each article that is about each of the latent topics. I 
elaborate on this method later in the chapter.  
Finally, I use both primary and secondary sources to assess alternative explanations. For 
quantitative evidence of the role of powerful interest groups and conservative think tanks, I use 
data on the presence of different organizations at Congressional hearings, gathered from 
Proquest Congressional. For the effect of public opinion, I rely on polling data from the Roper 
Center or from a compilation of Gallup polls (Brodinsky and Elam 1989). I also use Gallup’s 
Most Important Problem question, aggregated by the Comparative Agendas Project, to assess the 
public’s concern with education policy relative to other policy areas. 
The Case 
Increased Federal Intervention in Education Policy 
On April 11, 1965, Lyndon Johnson signed into law the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act (ESEA), the most sweeping federal education legislation in the United States. At 
the signing ceremony, Johnson, in front of his old school, said that ESEA would be the most 
important law he would sign as president, adding that the bill would give hope to over five 
million “educationally deprived” kids, provide millions of new books to schools, and ease the 
burden of local and state agencies.  
The passage of ESEA had a number of effects on education policy. First, the federal 
education budget increased substantially, much of it now going to local school districts for 
different education programs. From 1960 to 1985, the proportion of the education budget that 
came from the federal government increased from 8 percent to 16 percent, and the proportion 
coming from local governments fell from 51 percent to 31 percent (McGuinn 2006:37). Second, 
the geographic scope of the federal government’s funding of public school districts expanded. A 
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study in 1980 estimated that almost 90 percent of all public school districts in the 1977-1978 
school year had received at least some funding from ESEA’s signature program, Title I (Goor et 
al. 1980). And third, the federal government’s attention to education issues, as evidenced by the 
number of Congressional hearings, increased substantially. In sum, education, historically a 
locally controlled and financed issue in the U.S., was increasingly becoming a national issue.  
Figure 2.1. 






        Source: Comparative Agendas Project 
As policy feedback scholars have shown, major policies change the institutional 
landscape and often give rise to new organizations in a policy domain. The passage of ESEA 
and, consequently, more federal funding toward education was no different. The law led to the 
creation of a few dozen federal agencies, over a hundred new categorical programs, and new 
funding opportunities. In doing so, interest groups became more active in education policy, 
closely monitoring and advocating for the continuation of programs and funding streams 
(Cibulka 2001; Kirst and Jung 1980; Peterson and Rabe 1983). Many new interest groups were 
founded shortly after ESEA’s passage, but the law (and reauthorizations of it) had long-term 
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effects on interest group formation. In fact, aside from healthcare organizations, no other interest 
group sector grew as rapidly as education did between 1981 and 2006 (Schlozman 2010).8 
This cursory evidence suggests that positive feedback effects were present in education 
policy. This, in part, explains why—despite attacks from some conservatives in the 1980s and 
1990s against education programs and funds—the federal role in education did not decline and, 
with No Child Left Behind in 2001, became stronger. Nonetheless, increased federal funding 
toward education and the rise of groups interested in maintaining those programs (i.e., positive 
feedback) does not sufficiently explain the emergence of the new policy paradigm in the early 
1980s. Instead, I now present evidence of the ways the federal government set in motion 
negative feedback effects, undermining the equal access paradigm. 
Early Calls for Evaluation 
Even before ESEA was passed in 1965, federal policymakers were interested in 
evaluating the effectiveness of education policy. Despite passing with very little debate, ESEA 
included a provision, pushed for by Senator Robert Kennedy, to have states devise “objective 
measurements of educational achievement…for evaluating at least annually the effectiveness of 
the programs” for disadvantaged students. The Commissioner of Education, Frances Keppel, 
liked this provision but was afraid to implement it because “educators will scream bloody-
murder if anybody measures them,” saying a year later that pushing for national testing and 
standards would have “politically explosive implications” (quoted in Graham 1984:79, 115, 
117). 
 
8 Schlozman (2010) notes that much of the growth in the education sector was due to a greater lobbying presence by 
higher education institutions. Nonetheless, the number of non-university affiliated education organizations in the 
Washington Representatives dataset grew almost 200 percent in this same time period. 
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Further, the Coleman report, while focused on race, segregation, and the socioeconomic 
background of students, was important for another reason. As Keppel’s successor, Howard 
Howe, points out in the foreword, a major part of the report was its focus on outputs—how well 
students did on standardized achievement tests. This newfound focus on outputs, rather than just 
inputs (e.g., funding per student, library resources, etc.), had gained some prominence during 
Keppel’s tenure as Commissioner, and in 1969, the National Assessment of Educational Progress 
(NAEP) was first administered (Arum and Cook 2018; Jones and Olkin 2004). I return to the 
long-term effects these early concerns with evaluation—both of federal programs and of 
students—had, but I now turn to the ways that ESEA’s passage, along with broader changes in 
federal policy, institutionalized the federal government’s increased attention to policy 
assessment. 
Federal Investment in Research 
Starting in the 1960s and spurred by the programs of the Great Society, the federal 
government was increasingly investing in social research—the production and application of 
research focused on social problems. While only a small fraction of the government’s total 
investment in research and development (R&D), one study estimated that the government spent 
approximately $1.8 billion on social research in 1976, a threefold increase, in real terms, since 
the early 1960s (National Research Council 1978). Most notably, the government was 
increasingly funding research intended to demonstrate the feasibility of a proposed policy, better 
implement a policy already in place, or evaluate the effectiveness of a federal program. In the 
remainder of this section, I show how the federal investment in research differed in education 
policy compared to other social policies. 
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The federal government’s funding of R&D increased substantially starting in the 1950s. 9 
In the early to mid-1950s, investment in R&D hovered around $100 million, but by 1966, 
funding was approximately $15 billion. While about 70 percent of this amount went to 
development, the government’s investment in research also increased in this time period, 
especially in the 1960s. Funding toward research rose from $1.9 billion in 1960 to $4.7 billion in 
1966. By one estimate, funding for research in the life and physical sciences constituted about 96 
percent of this total. (Anon 1967c). Nonetheless, funding toward social research—classified by 
the NSF as research in psychology and social sciences—grew from $73 million in 1960 to $325 
million in 1966. More than half of the funding for social research in 1966 went to one 
department—Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). HEW’s social research budget increased 
approximately eightfold from 1960 to 1966, in large part due to the increased funding going 
toward research in education (Anon 1967c).  
Why did funding toward research in education increase in the 1960s? Up to the 1950s, 
much of the research in the Office of Education was geared toward data collection and 
dissemination, but in 1954, the Cooperative Research Act authorized the office to fund research 
initiated externally, mostly by academics. Funding for “field-initiated” research hovered around 
$1 million, but because of the Vocational Education Act of 1963 and Title IV of ESEA in 1965, 
the budget toward education research increased to $17 million in 1965, $70 million in 1966, and 
exceeded $100 million in 1967 (National Research Council 1992). In addition to increased 
funding, the Bureau of Research was established in 1965, and the Office of Education’s support 
toward research and development expanded considerably. National R&D centers were created in 
1963, with the intention of conducting large-scale research toward “solving education problems,” 
 
9 For good overviews of the federal government’s investment in research and development in the mid-20th century, 
see Owen-Smith (2018) and Thelin (2019). 
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and regional educational laboratories were authorized as part of ESEA to put into practice 
research on curriculum and teaching approaches (Anon 1967d; National Research Council 1992).  
Applied Research 
 
Research funded by the Office of Education and other agencies overseeing social policies 
(e.g., the Office of Economic Opportunity) differed in important ways from other agencies. Most 
notably, the federal government classifies research it funds as either “basic” or “applied.” The 
former is research intended to increase knowledge or understanding of some phenomenon, and 
the latter is research with a practical application for “determining the means by which a 
recognized need may be met” (National Science Foundation n.d.).  
Three points about applied research are worth noting, based on evidence from NSF’s 
survey of federal research funding. First, the government increased its funding for applied 
research significantly in the late 1950s and 1960s. In real terms, applied research funding 
increased fourfold from 1957 to 1966 and would not reach its 1966 peak again until the 1990s. 
Second, applied research, relative to basic research, was higher in social research (i.e., funds 
going toward psychology and social science studies) than it was in other fields. At its peak, 
applied research accounted for 75 percent of all research in psychology and social sciences in 
1976, compared to 63 percent of research in other fields. Third, and relatedly, because much of 
the research done on social policies was conducted by social scientists, a larger share of research 






  Source: National Science Foundation’s Survey of Federal Funds for Research and Development 
Figure 2.4. 
     
Source: National Science Foundation’s Survey of Federal Funds for Research and Development 
30 
 
The sharp increase in the 1950s and early to mid-1960s (and subsequent, quick leveling 
off in the late 1960s and 1970s) of funding toward applied research is a reflection of the faith, 
among many policymakers, in intellectuals and academics to help solve policy problems. In the 
post-World War II era, this often meant using the expertise of intellectuals and academics in 
matters of national security (e.g., President Dwight Eisenhower’s call for help from intellectuals 
in the “ideological war against communism” (quoted in Anon 1967c).  
The expected role of the social scientist in policymaking only increased in the Kennedy 
and Johnson administrations. In an address to the Brookings Institution in 1966, President 
Johnson emphasized the role social scientists should play in evaluation, saying, “the power to 
evaluate…is the power to find the marrow of the problem…It is the power to say, about public 
policies or private choices, ‘this works. But this does not’” (Johnson 1966). Liberal Congressmen 
also shared this faith in social scientists to address social problems. In 1967, two bills were 
introduced in the Senate that would have created a National Foundation for the Social Sciences 
and a Council of Social Advisers (Anon 1967b, Anon 1967a). Arguing that, in the area of social 
policy, the government lacks the data and analysis that is provided by the Council of Economic 
Advisers, Walter Mondale said that a Council of Social Advisers would, among other things, 
“help develop program priorities [and] evaluate the effectiveness and impact of our efforts at all 
levels of government” (Anon 1967b:2653). 
Government bureaucrats also highlighted the importance of applied research. Francis 
Ianni, who served as Associate Commissioner for Research in the Office of Education, said that, 
whereas in the past, the Office of Education was “satisfied with the idea of supporting research if 
and when a good research idea was presented,” the approach of the mid-1960s was to evaluate 
the needs of education and “look for and deliberately ask for needed research” (Anon 1967d). In 
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short, the push for applied, policy-focused research was driven by policy leaders encouraging a 
more technocratic and scientific approach to policy formulation and implementation. 
Despite this faith in the ways that research could be used in policymaking and the 
increased spending on social research in the 1950s and 1960s, this newfound enthusiasm soon 
tapered off. The two aforementioned bills did not pass, and the late 1960s economic slump and 
Democratic losses in Congress and the presidential election in 1968 slowed down government 
support of social scientific, applied research. The proportion of NSF funding going toward the 
social sciences declined in the 1970s (Solovey 2012). Further, my analyses show that the 
proportion of the federal budget going toward R&D in agencies overseeing social policies such 
as education, labor, housing, and social security reached an apex in the late 1960s and early 
1970s.  
Although officials in the Office of Education often complained that a small proportion of 
their overall budget went to research, education differed in important ways from other agencies. 
First, funding toward education research, both in number and proportion of total federal funding, 
exceeded research in other major social policy arenas—including labor, housing, and income 





Sources: National Science Foundation’s Survey of Federal Funds for Research and Development; Comparative Agendas Project 
Second, a detailed breakdown of research activities indicates that a larger proportion of 
funding in education was going toward research focused specifically on policy formulation and 
implementation. A study by the National Research Council (NRC) provides a more detailed 
picture of social scientific research than is found in the NSF data.10 By doing so, the NRC report 
provides a clearer picture of the prevalence of policy-related research conducted by social 
scientists for federal agencies and departments. 
The report estimates that, of the $1.8 billion invested in all social research in 1976, 
education received $305 million (17 percent), more than any other department or agency and 
much more than policy areas such as labor, housing, and income security (only agriculture and 
 
10 For details on the differences, see the appendix in National Research Council (1978). Rather than a simple 
breakdown of research into basic or applied research, the NRC report uses the following categories: research (both 
basic and applied), general purpose statistics, policy formulation demonstrations, policy implementation 
demonstrations, program evaluations, and the development and dissemination of research materials. 
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health come close). More tellingly, the kind of research conducted on education differed 
considerably from other policy areas. Of the $1.8 billion invested by all federal agencies and 
departments, the report estimated that $949 million (52 percent) went toward either research or 
general purpose statistics, and $449 million (25 percent) went toward policy formulation or 
implementation demonstrations or program evaluations. In education, on the other hand, 16 
percent went toward either research or general purpose statistics and 58 percent went toward 
policy formulation or implementation demonstrations or program evaluations (National Research 
Council 1978 table 4). In summary, while federal funding toward research leveled off, in real 
terms, in the 1970s and declined as a proportion of total federal funding, a significant portion of 
funding toward research in education in the leadup to the 1980s focused on evaluations and 
assessments of education policies and programs.  
Structure of Education Research 
Doctorates Awarded 
 
In addition to the increased government funding toward policy-related research in 
education policy in the 1960s and 1970s, the academic study of education was also burgeoning in 
this time period. Education has been one of the largest academic fields in the United States since 
the early 20th century.11 While academia grew considerably in all fields in the 1960s and 1970s, 
the rate of growth in education outpaced that of other fields. The number of doctorates awarded 
in most fields—including in the humanities, economics, sociology, and biology—grew by about 
two to three times from the 1960-1964 cohort to the 1980-1984 cohort. In this same time period, 
the number of doctorates in the field of education grew fourfold. From 1970 to 1984, over 
 
11 From 1920 until 1959, approximately 15 percent of all doctorates awarded in the U.S. were in education, higher 




107,000 doctorates were awarded in education, more than all of the social sciences and the fast 
growing field of psychology combined. 
Figure 2.6. 
 
    Source: Survey of Earned Doctorates from National Science Foundation (2006) 
A few education subfields grew significantly in the 1960s and 1970s. Of the top five 
subfields in the late 1980s, the two that saw the most significant change from the early 1960s 
were the study of curriculum/instruction and educational psychology. Relatedly, the field of 
psychology, like education as a whole, grew more rapidly in this time period than other social 
sciences. And some of the most closely related psychology subfields to education—including 
counseling, developmental/child psychology, and educational psychology—all saw substantial 
increases in the number of doctorates granted. All told, the study of education with a focus on 
curriculum, classroom environments, and learning and teaching methods was booming. In fact, 
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while most other academic fields continued to grow (in terms of doctorates awarded) in the 
1980s and 1990s, the peak year for doctorates awarded in the field of education was 1980. 
Figure 2.7. 
 
    Source: Survey of Earned Doctorates from National Science Foundation (2006) 
Journal Foundings 
 
More so than most other similar fields, the field of education saw consistent and 
sustained growth of academic journal foundings from 1960 to 1990. On average, a little more 
than 10 journals were founded a year. The field saw the highest level of growth in the 1960s, and 
it was not until the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s that psychology and economics/business 
journals, respectively, saw the same level of growth as education. In addition to outpacing most 
social science fields, the number of new foundings in education journals far outnumbered other 
substantive policy fields such as environmental studies and housing and urban affairs, both of 
which also received significant attention from policymakers during this time. Focusing on 
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subfields within education, the evidence shows that journals from one subfield—teaching 
methods and curriculum—had the strongest and most consistent growth in this time period, more 
so than school organization, special education, and higher education. 
Figure 2.8. 
 






         Source: Ulrich’s Directory 
Effect of Government on Education Research 
Using the articles in the ERIC database, I now turn to the ways that the content of 
education research was changing in the 1960s and 1970s. I examine two kinds of changes: the 
number of studies of ESEA’s implementation, and the relative prominence of the mid-1960s 
paradigm compared to the emerging paradigm of the 1980s. I then assess the effect that federal 
education agencies had on both kinds of change. 
There are 384,282 articles indexed by ERIC that were published between 1960 and 1982 
and that were not about higher education or an international topic.12 Because ERIC includes 
articles about many different aspects of education and to ensure that I am capturing publications 
that pertain specifically to academic achievement, I only include articles in which one of the 
 
12 I start my analysis in 1960 to show time trends before ESEA was passed.  
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subject indexes is “Academic Achievement,” one of the most common subjects in the database. 
This gives me a sample of 10,124 publications that pertain to non-higher-education academic 
achievement in the United States.13 
In addition to using the subject indexes, I use the keywords field in the database to search 
for publications that were about any ESEA program, and I use the sponsors field to search for 
whether a publication was sponsored (i.e., financially supported). In particular, I code this 
variable for whether a publication was funded by one of the main federal education agencies 
(either the Office of Education or another education agency in HEW or in the Department of 
Education after it was created in 1979). I also search for whether a publication was funded by a 
private foundation. 
Of the 10,124 publications on academic achievement between 1960 and 1982, 
approximately 24 percent were supported by at least one sponsor. Of that sponsored research, 71 
percent (or about 17 percent of all publications) were supported by one of the main federal 
agencies in education. The other approximately 30 percent of sponsored studies were either 
funded by other federal agencies, local and state governments, private foundations, or for-profit 
companies. The number of federally sponsored research increased substantially in the late 1960s 
and 1970s, peaking in the late 1970s. 
  
 
13 The initial sample size was 10,908, but 784 (7 percent) do not have a description of the article, so my sample size 
decreases to 10,124. In time trends figures, I extend the analysis to 1994 to show how trends were different before 





The publication of the Coleman report, the Johnson administration’s push for measuring 
academic achievement, and the first administration of NAEP began to reorient education 
research toward a focus on outputs—how well students did—spurring a question that came to 
dominate education research: which inputs lead to the intended outputs? With the passage of 
ESEA in 1965, the main input to examine was more funding toward local school districts. How 
prevalent were studies of ESEA, and how prominent were education agencies in supporting this 
research? Before 1983, there were almost 500 studies of ESEA.14 Most of these studies were 
carried out in the 1970s, and the number of studies on the law dropped off significantly in the 
mid-1980s. Further, whereas education agencies sponsored approximately 17 percent of all 
academic achievement publications before 1983, those same agencies sponsored 38 percent of 
 
14 This is almost certainly an undercount. In more than a third of the publications, no keyword in ERIC is used, so it 
is likely that a number of these publications were about ESEA. 
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ESEA studies, suggesting that the federal government played an outsized role in the study of the 
policy’s effects. This would, I show below, have an effect on the ways in which problems in 
education would be framed in the early 1980s. 
How did the content of research change during this time period? As described above, I 
code each article for whether it includes a subject index belonging to the old paradigm or the 
new paradigm (note that neither or both might be present).15 For simplicity’s sake, in analyses 
below, I call the old paradigm “access” and the new paradigm “quality.” As expected, the mid-
1960s witnessed a proliferation of education articles on access. Approximately 40 percent of 
articles on academic achievement in the ERIC database in the mid-1960s focused in some way 
on inequitable access, but that proportion steadily declined that, by 1980, less than a quarter of 
achievement articles were focused on inequitable access. The general trend for quality articles—
ones focused on topics such as basic skill attainment, standards and assessment, and school and 
teacher effectiveness—in the 1970s was the opposite. The proportion of achievement articles 
focused on quality education was steadily increasing and, by the early 1980s, exceeded the 
number of articles focused on access. 
  
 





Did the federal government affect this shift? To answer this question, I use two strategies. 
First, I run a logistic regression to predict the likelihood of the main education agencies funding 
a publication that focuses on quality. Based on my coding strategy above, each of the 10,124 
academic achievement articles is either classified as including a quality topic or not.16 I regress 
this variable on my education agencies sponsorship dummy variable and include the following as 
controls: whether the study was funded by a private foundation and years since ESEA’s passage 
in 1965. Table 1 shows summary statistics of variables in the analysis, and table 2 shows results 
of two logistic regression models. To assess whether education agencies were funding quality-
based studies more over time, the second model in table 2 includes an interaction term. 
  
 
16 For the analysis, I exclude articles published before ESEA was passed, resulting in an N of 9,900. 
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Table 2.1. Summary Statistics of Variables Used For Logistic Regressions 
 N Mean SD 
Articles Focused on “Quality” 9900 0.239 0.427 
Sponsorship by Education Agencies 9900 0.176 0.381 
Years Since ESEA (1965) 9900 10.491 4. 339 
Foundation Sponsorship 9900 0.011 0.104 
 
 
Table 2.2. Logistic Regression of “Quality” Publications in ERIC, 1966-1982 
 Model 1 Model 2 
   
Sponsorship by Education Agencies 0.446*** -0.060 
 (0.058) (0.164) 
Years Since ESEA (1965) 0.035*** 0.026*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Foundation Sponsorship -0.068 -0.060 
 (0.231) (0.231) 
Sponsorship by Education Agencies X Years Since ESEA  0.047*** 
  (0.014) 
Constant -1.612*** -1.512*** 
 (0.066) (0.072) 
N 9900 9900 
BIC 10841.1 10839.0 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The results from the first logistic regression model confirm the trend line above: the 
prevalence of academic achievement publications focused on quality topics increased over time. 
Model 1 also indicates that the main education agencies were 50 percent more likely to sponsor 
the study of a quality topic than a non-quality topic. The model also suggests that foundations 
were not more or less likely to sponsor studies focused on quality.17 The second model, which 
includes an interaction between government sponsorship and years since ESEA, shows that the 
 
17 Foundations were more likely to sponsor research on access topics during this time period. Forty-one percent of 
foundation-sponsored studies were on access issues, compared to 30 percent for non-foundation-sponsored studies. 
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likelihood of education agencies funding studies of quality issues became statistically significant 
after 1970 and increased over time. 
Figure 2.12. 
 
I now turn to using topic modeling to answer the same question. I use the text of all 
descriptions of academic achievement articles before 1983 for my topic models.18 A common 
critique of topic modeling is that researchers have to choose the number of latent topics for the 
body of texts, an often subjective and difficult to replicate process. I address these concerns in 
the appendix. But briefly, I run models that include different numbers of topics, and based on a 
number of diagnostics, choose the best three to run regressions on. For each of these three 
 
18 I also run these analyses not just on publications about academic achievement, but also on the full sample of ERIC 
articles (N=384,282), and the results were not substantively different. 
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models, I run a regression that estimates the effect of sponsorship by education agencies on the 
proportion of each article that is about each of the topics in the model. I control, similarly to the 
logistic regression above, for publication year and whether an article was funded by a private 
foundation. 
I report findings from the best model here (with twelve topics) and include the other two 
in the appendix, noting that the main finding is consistent across the three models. Figure 13 
shows the relative prevalence of the twelve topics of the academic achievement articles in the 
ERIC database from 1960 to 1982 and shows that these articles ranged from self-esteem and 
child development to evaluations of federal programs.  
Figure 2.13. Topic Proportions, Best Model (K=12) 
 
Figure 14 shows a difference in proportion plot of the findings from the topic model 
regression. Specifically, the figure plots the difference in likelihood that federally funded articles 
(compared to non-federally funding articles) are about any of the twelve topics. The results show 
federal education agencies were more likely to fund research on three broad topics: the effects of 
federal programs, assessment, and classroom instruction, and federal agencies were the least 
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likely to fund research on student self-esteem or parental influence on academic achievement. 
More notably, the federal government was also less likely to fund research projects on race and 
desegregation. 
Figure 2.14. Effect of Federal Sponsorship on Topic Proportions, Best Model (K=12) 
 
Dissatisfaction Among Academics 
The analysis so far focuses on the role of the federal government and the structural 
changes in the academic study of education to explain the shift toward the new policy paradigm. 
In this section, I turn my attention to the role that dissatisfaction among academics played in the 
emergence of the new paradigm. The earliest studies of the role that schools could play in 
promoting equal educational opportunities and outcomes were led by sociologists: the Coleman 
report and Christopher Jencks et al.’s Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of the Family and 
Schooling in America in 1972. The authors of both studies concluded that, more so than school-
based variables, students’ family backgrounds had more significant effects on their academic 
achievement. These studies set off a large debate in academia about the role of schools, and, in 
the ensuing years, many researchers were interested in verifying or disconfirming Coleman’s and 
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Jencks’s findings.19 For some scholars, the research on school effectiveness was part advocacy. 
Finding the ways that schools can improve academic achievement was a way to advocate for 
students, especially those from poor, urban areas (Ralph and Fennessey 1983; Wimpelberg, 
Teddlie, and Stringfield 1989). In a widely cited study of the effects of schools on the academic 
achievement of students in poor urban areas, Edmonds argued that, to reform public education to 
benefit children living in poverty, one must “[repudiate]…the social science notion that family 
background is the principal cause of pupil acquisition of basic school skills” (1979:23). 
The focus on school effectiveness was also spurred on by early studies of ESEA. The 
emerging consensus in the 1970s was that compensatory education programs funded by ESEA’s 
Title I had mixed, if little, effect on academic achievement.20 In turn, researchers turned their 
attention to other inputs that may have an effect on student outcomes. The reaction by 
researchers to the conclusions of Coleman/Jencks and of the ESEA studies, however, was not 
merely advocacy. The impetus behind the surge in research on effective schools was also 
practical. Specifically citing Coleman et al.’s and Jencks et al.’s research, Purkey and Smith, in a 
review of the literature, say that, “Many factors shown to have a dramatic influence on student 
learning—family background and related variables—are not easy to manipulate, at least not in 
the short run” (1983:426). The consequence of these two factors—that family and 
socioeconomic background are hard to change and that funding from the federal government had 
done little to narrow the achievement gap—was that research on academic achievement 
increasingly focused on school environments and classroom instruction. Compared to family 
 
19 For a review of the school effectiveness research at the time, see Mackenzie 1983; Purkey and Smith 1982, 1983; 
Wimpelberg, Teddlie, and Stringfield 1989.  
 
20 McLaughlin (1975) argues that this emerging consensus was mostly due to the fact that, because of administrative 
reasons, many studies of ESEA were poorly executed. 
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background and poverty, schools and classrooms could be manipulated in ways that would 
improve students’ academic achievement. 
The dissatisfaction toward the Coleman and Jencks studies set off another chain of 
reactions among academics. The early school effectiveness studies were criticized less so for 
their advocacy and more for their methodological shortcomings. Specifically, researchers argued 
that early school effectiveness studies were too narrowly focused on poor, urban, elementary 
schools, were hampered by small sample size, and did not always include control variables 
(Purkey and Smith 1982; Ralph and Fennessey 1983; Wimpelberg et al. 1989). Consequently, 
starting in the early 1980s, researchers expanded studies of schools to include those from less 
urban and higher SES areas and more often controlled for school expenditures (which, 
inevitably, often includes federal aid). The predominant research question, therefore, became: 
what factors, aside from expenditures, predict higher academic achievement in all schools (not 
just poor ones)? This research question, with less attention on poor schools and financial inputs, 
inevitably shifted the focus from socioeconomic conditions and unequal access to school 
efficiency. 
A consensus, even among academics skeptical of the methodological rigor of the early 
school effectiveness research, was emerging about which school factors matter most. In addition 
to effective leadership, increased instructional time in the classroom, and parental involvement, 
reviews of the research on effective schools pointed to clear curriculum articulation, high 
expectations of students, and consistent monitoring of student progress as ways to improve 
academic achievement (Purkey and Smith 1982, 1983; Ralph and Fennessey 1983 endnote 1). 
These findings were already having an effect on policymaking in the late 1970s, especially at the 
state level (Pipho 1978). And the focus on clear curriculum, high expectations, and consistent 
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monitoring would only become more prominent after A Nation at Risk and other reports were 
published in the early 1980s.  
Alternative Explanations 
I show above how academics, with support from federal education agencies, and their 
ideas came to play a prominent role in the emergence of the new paradigm.21 In this section, I 
assess other possible explanations, focusing on the three most prominent: powerful interest 
groups, political actors, and public opinion. Scholars have noted that the most powerful interest 
groups in education policy in the 1970s and early 1980s were the bloc of organizations 
commonly referred to as the “Big Six,” which included the largest teachers’ unions and 
professional associations representing local and state school administrators (Moe 2011). While 
these organizations were certainly not always united, much of the focus of the bloc and other, 
smaller professional associations was about what kind of federal aid was best or whether the 
government was investing enough in education (Kirst and Jung 1980; Peterson and Rabe 1983). 
And when the reports of the early 1980s, including A Nation at Risk, were published, Toch 
(1991) convincingly shows that the “Big Six” either ignored the reports or were critical of them.  
Nonetheless, the landscape of interest groups in education was changing in the 1980s and 
two sets of organizations became more prominent, both in education policy and more broadly in 
national politics: business groups, such as the Business Roundtable, and conservative think tanks 
(Brown 2015; Debray 2006; Medvetz 2012; Stahl 2016). While these groups were ascendant in 
the 1970s, I find that they had little influence on the emergence of the new paradigm in 
education. As most accounts show, these groups became prominent players in education after the 
 
21 Academics were especially prominent in shaping A Nation at Risk. One of the ERIC clearinghouses published a 
list of eighteen academic documents that were commissioned or prepared for the Commission on Excellence 
Education’s use in writing up the report (ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education 1983).  
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paradigm had emerged (Mehta 2013b). Rather than initiating these ideas, business groups, 
conservative think tanks, and other groups that had initially opposed the new paradigm, were 
influential in translating the new paradigm into legislative victories. 
I marshal three pieces of evidence to support this argument. First, I classify the research 
in ERIC on academic achievement by the type of institution carrying out the research.22 Of 
articles in ERIC with an institutional affiliation, I find that 39 percent before 1984 were 
conducted by researchers with a university affiliation, compared to 16 percent by professional 
associations, research institutes, or think tanks.23 Between 1984 and 1994, the numbers were 15 
percent and 25 percent, respectively, suggesting that, non-university affiliated organizations’ 
influence in education research increased after the paradigm emerged.  
Second, I assess the influence of business groups and conservative think tanks in 
education politics. Using a list of witnesses at all Congressional hearings, I search for the 
presence of the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the Business 
Roundtable.24 I estimate that these three groups testified 118 times before 1983, but only twice at 
a hearing on education policy. In contrast, these three groups testified 50 times on issues related 
to macroeconomic policy or banking and finance and another 17 times on issues related to 
government operations.25 These numbers support the argument that these groups may have been 
 
22 I extend the time period to 1994, increasing the number of academic achievement articles to 19,092. Of these, 
ERIC gives an institutional affiliation for 7,144 articles (37 percent). 
 
23 To classify organizations in the ERIC database, I use keyword searches and both the Encyclopedia of 
Associations, compiled by the Comparative Agendas Project, and the Washington Representatives data, compiled by 
Schlozman and colleagues (Anon n.d.; Schlozman, Brady, and Verba 2012).  
 
24 See Author (2019) for more about this newly compiled dataset. 
 
25 I use the Comparative Agendas Project classification of hearings by policy area.  
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influential in issues such as tax policy and the size of the federal government, but were largely 
irrelevant in education policy. 
Next, I examine the specific recommendations made by the Heritage Foundation, the 
think tank that had considerable influence on the incoming Reagan administration in 1981 (Ball 
2013; Knickerbocker 1984; Stahl 2016 ch. 3). The authors of the think tank’s highly influential 
Mandate for Leadership devoted a chapter on education policy. While they criticized the 
government’s focus on promoting equitable access, it said very little about the need for higher 
standards or expectations of students. Instead, as part of a more general critique of the 
government, the authors recommended more local control and less federal funding toward 
education (Heatherly 1981). 
The Heritage Foundation’s focus on federal funding and local control was part of a larger 
conservative critique of education policy, including from Ronald Reagan. Much has been written 
about Reagan’s call, during his first presidential campaign, to abolish the newly established 
Department of Education (Hechinger 1980). And scholars have also noted that Reagan was both 
skeptical about creating the commission that would publish A Nation at Risk and wanted, after its 
publication, to downplay it—in part because he wanted the federal government to play a much 
lesser role in education (Mehta 2013a; Toch 1991).  
Finally, public opinion polls suggest three consistent findings. First, the public generally 
opposed Reagan’s call for abolishing the Department of Education and decreasing federal 
involvement. For example, a majority in 1981 opposed his proposed $1.25 billion cut to 
education (Harris 1981). While Americans often favor more local control in education matters, 
polls since the 1960s show that clear majorities favor federal funding (and sometimes increases) 
toward education. Second, when asked open-ended questions about what concerns people most 
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about education in their communities, the three most consistent answers before the 1980s were 
students’ discipline, school financing, and racial integration (Brodinsky and Elam 1989).26 Third, 
and relatedly, education policy was, compared to other policy areas, not a salient issue for the 
public before the paradigm’s emergence. Using Gallup’s Most Important Problem survey, I find 
that education did not become a salient issue, in the public’s mind, until the late 1980s and early 




  Source: Gallup’s Most Important Problem Survey, aggregated by the Comparative Agendas Project 
  
 
26 Poor curriculum and poor standards made it into the top three in 1980. 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
In a relatively short period of time, the discussion among education reformers and 
policymakers shifted from a focus on the need for equitable access to a need for high academic 
standards and better quality education. The new policy paradigm, emerging in full force in the 
1980s has had long-term effects in education policy. In addition to many state-level policy 
changes, the focus on standards and quality education increased the federal government’s role in 
education policy. In the 1980s, when the budgets of many federal programs were cut and 
regulations were loosened, the federal budget toward education remained relatively stable and 
would later increase. More importantly, Congress would pass the Improving America’s Schools 
Act in 1994 and No Child Left Behind in 2001, altering the federal government’s expectations of 
states and local school districts—calling for stronger standards, regular monitoring of student 
outcomes, and accountability measures (Manna 2006; McDermott 2011). 
In this chapter, I show that the emergence of the paradigm that would lead to these policy 
changes came about as a result of a two-stage process that began in the 1960s (Berman 2013). In 
the first stage, demand for new ideas was fueled by both the federal government and academics. 
While the federal government, with its passage of ESEA in 1965, increased funding toward 
education programs in socioeconomically disadvantaged districts, other policies from this time 
period also created what I argue were negative feedback effects. Specifically, the government 
increasingly funded applied research in an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of implemented 
policies, and this kind of evaluation was especially prominent in education.  
In conjunction, academics also spurred the demand for new ideas, doing so because of 
their dissatisfaction with the existing paradigm. Academics that were part of the so-called 
effective schools movement, argued against the view that students’ socioeconomic status was the 
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main determinate of their academic achievement. Pointing to the inadequacy of early studies of 
academic achievement and to the results of other studies that showed federal funding had little 
effect on achievement, these academics argued that more research was needed on which 
characteristics of schools best improved student outcomes.  
The second stage of the process—an increase in the supply of ideas—was also driven by 
academics and the federal government. The content of the academic study of student 
achievement changed in ways that would come to influence the new paradigm of the early 1980s. 
Academics were increasingly studying school interventions—topics such as educational 
psychology, curriculum and instruction, teaching methods, and assessments—more so than 
topics such as socioeconomic conditions, desegregation, and school financing. Two factors drove 
this change. The structure of academia in education—in particular, graduate programs and 
academic journals—provided more opportunities for the study of school interventions. And 
federal education agencies, who funded at least 1,700 studies on academic achievement before A 
Nation at Risk was published in 1983, were more likely to fund research on school intervention 
topics. Figure 16 illustrates the main theoretical arguments made in the chapter.  






Implications for the Study of Ideas and Institutional Change 
The findings from this chapter contribute to the literature on the role of ideas in politics 
and policymaking. While much research has focused on the role of exogenous events, crises, 
powerful interest groups, and political elites in driving policy ideas, I focus on the role that 
policies, government agencies, and academics contribute to changing policy ideas. My findings 
contribute to the policy feedback literature by showing that policies and government agencies 
often create negative feedbacks (Béland et al. 2019; Jacobs and Weaver 2015). The case of 
education policy in the U.S. certainly supports the idea that policies—by incentivizing interest 
groups to mobilize for the continued support of the policy—create positive feedbacks. But by 
increasing its focus on applied research and the effectiveness of recently implemented policies, 
the federal government also created negative feedbacks—opening up ESEA, in particular, to 
attacks about its inability to improve students’ academic achievement. In doing so, this created 
an opportunity for academics and others to shift the focus away from school financing toward the 
importance of better curriculum and instruction and higher standards.  
My findings also lend support to the view that ideational change is often a slow process 
driven by endogenous processes (Berman and Pagnucco 2010; Campbell and Pedersen 2014), 
and that ideas, independent of the interests of those holding them, often determine which actions 
are taken (Weber 1915). While I do find that the emergence of the new paradigm in education 
policy followed a two stage process—where old ideas are critiqued and new ones are 
introduced—the evidence presented here (and more fully in chapter 4) suggests that the first 
stage did not entail a wholesale jettisoning of old ideas. The focus on better curriculum and 
instruction and higher standards was—for many academics, government officials, reformers, 
and, later, politicians—complementary to the past focus on students’ socioeconomic conditions. 
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Equitable outcomes, the argument went, would be better achieved not with more financial inputs 
but with better curriculum and higher standards. 
 The debates among academics—about the best ways to improve students’ academic 
achievement—that I highlight in this chapter came to play an influential role in the reports and 
political debates that dominated education policy in the 1980s and 1990s. Further, the evidence I 
present suggests that the demand and supply of new ideas, in the late 1960s and 1970s, were not 
driven by powerful interests, partisan think tanks, or politicians. Instead, I suggest that these 
three groups appropriated the new ideas to advance their political interests (Berman and 
Pagnucco 2010). In particular, for political conservatives, a focus on school efficiency and higher 
standards meant a shift away from federal funding of education. And for liberals, including civil 
rights organizations, high standards and assessments had the potential to promote equity 
(Campaign for Genuine Accountability in Education 1991; Commission on Chapter 1 1992). I 
return to these points in chapter 4. 
Implications for the Study of American Policies and Politics 
I also provide new insights on education policy in the United States. My research locates 
the emergence of the new policy paradigm earlier than most accounts and sheds light on what 
has been called the “forgotten standards movement” (Mehta 2013b). While it is true that much 
action on standards and accountability in the 1970s was occurring at the state level, federal 
policymakers and academics were setting the stage for standards and, later, accountability to be 
part of federal education policymaking debates.  
The role that academics and intellectuals play in the policymaking process also provides 
some new insights on the rightward turn in U.S. politics since the 1970s (Medvetz 2012; 
O’Connor 2002; Schulman and Zelizer 2008). My findings suggest that academics in the field of 
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education, by turning their gaze toward effective schools and higher standards, shifted the focus 
away from the structural conditions that social scientists continue to find have strong effects on 
students’ academic achievement. While researchers have noted the prominence of economists, 
especially in the U.S., and the ways that they have influenced policymaking (Bernstein 2004; 
Christensen 2017; Fourcade 2009), many of the prominent academics in the effective schools 
movement were not trained in economics, but instead in psychology. The findings from this 
chapter suggest two future directions in research on how academics shape policymaking. First, 
researchers have been increasingly attuned to the ways ideas have shaped policy areas such as 
social welfare spending and tax policy, but less has been done on areas such as healthcare, 
environmental policy, housing policy, and foreign affairs. Second, and relatedly, much attention 
has (rightly) focused on how economists and their “style of reasoning” (Hacking 1992; Reay 
2012) have shaped the public sphere, but future research could benefit from focusing on the role 
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CHAPTER THREE: POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP AND COLLECTIVE ACTION: 
EXPLAINING THE GROWTH OF INTEREST GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Abstract 
What explains the growth in the number of interest groups in the United States? While 
scholars have proposed a number of broad theoretical explanations for this rise (and for 
determinants of collective action, more broadly), a systematic analysis of interest group 
growth—across policy domains—in the U.S. is lacking. In this chapter, I test the effects that four 
broad sets of explanations (resource mobilization, policy changes, political partisanship, and 
issue salience) have on the growth of interest groups. My analysis spans a time period (1970-
2005) in which the number of interest groups increased threefold and in which policy changes 
are increasingly determined by the interests of these groups (Gilens and Page 2014). Using data 
broken down by policy domain (e.g., health, environment, education), I find that, in addition to 
resource mobilization, high partisanship on an issue—as measured by Congressional roll call 
votes—is consistently associated with interest group growth. These findings suggest that highly 
partisan and, therefore, competitive policy domains provide a signal to potential groups that their 
work may shape that domain. 
 






Scholars have noted that the number of interest groups in the United States grew 
considerably in the last half of the 20th century (Berry and Wilcox 2015; Skocpol 1999; Walker 
1991). Researchers have noted that this rise has been seen in many different policy domains, 
including education, health, and the environment (Carmichael, Jenkins, and Brulle 2012; 
Johnson and Frickel 2011; Schlozman 2010). Given that interest groups have been shown to 
influence policy outcomes, a better understanding of the reasons for these groups’ growth can 
provide insights into the policymaking process (Andrews and Edwards 2004; Burstein and 
Linton 2002; Gilens and Page 2014; Hojnacki et al. 2012; Olzak and Ryo 2007; Portney and 
Berry 2015; Yerena 2015).  
While scholars define the term slightly differently, there is general agreement that interest 
groups are formally organized groups—both those with members and without—that try to 
influence the decisions of policymakers and other government officials (Baumgartner and Leech 
1998; Berry 1999; Cigler, Loomis, and Nownes 2020; Knoke 1986). While some interest 
groups—especially ones without members—focus all of their efforts on policy advocacy, others 
focus much of their attention on supporting and representing historically marginalized groups, 
such as racial minorities, women, and workers. As seen in figure 1, the number of interest 
groups—categorized as public affairs and social welfare organizations in the widely used 
Encyclopedia of Association database—rose from approximately 1,000 in 1970 to over 3,000 in 
the early 2000s. 
In this chapter, I test the effects of four broad factors on the growth of interest groups. 
Using data from the Encyclopedia of Associations and other datasets compiled by the 
Comparative Agendas Project, I focus on how resource mobilization, policy changes, political 
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partisanship, and issue salience affected interest group growth in the United States. While 
scholars have written about the determinants of interest group formation and growth, much of the 
existing literature focuses on one policy domain and tests only one set of explanations, and little 
has been done to provide insight across policy domains (Bevan et al. 2013). Insights into why 
the number of interest groups in a policy domain increases are particularly salient for education 
policy, because, as I show in chapter 4, education interest groups’ framing of ideas in the early 
1990s were influential in the passage of significant legislation.  
Figure 3.1. 
 
Determinants of Interest Group Growth 
Social scientists have long been interested in the growth, and influence, of interest groups 
in American politics (Berry 1993; Knoke 1986; Walker 1991). As Knoke (1986:1) argued more 
than 30 years ago, the “advocacy explosion” of the time encouraged a lot of research on the 
70 
 
topic. Research on the growth of interest groups was part of a larger trend of researchers 
interested in the determinants of collective action. While sociologists have typically focused on 
individual-level participation in social movements and civic engagement (Curtis, Baer, and 
Grabb 2001; Klandermans 2007; Rotolo and Wilson 2014; Schofer and Longhofer 2011) and 
political scientists have focused on interest groups and political engagement (Campbell 2006), 
the broad theoretical reasons for collective action are relatively similar across social science 
disciplines. In short, scholars have argued that interest groups (and, similarly, social movement 
and voluntary associations) often rely on resources (often, material), changes in policymaking, 
attention from and competition among political elites, and salience (or grievances). I review each 
of these broad factors below.  
Much of the research on organizational growth focuses on one issue area or takes a broad 
outlook, often tracking the growth of all interest groups over time. In this chapter, I examine the 
growth of interest groups across policy domains, which Burstein (Burstein 1991:328) defines as 
the “component of the political system that is organized around substantive issues” and that share 
functional characteristics. Policy domains, then, are analogous to other terms scholars use, 
including policy areas, issue domains, and, as the Comparative Agendas Project calls them, 
major topics. Focusing the analysis on policy domains is important for three reasons (Burstein 
1991). First, policy domains are often self-contained with their own issues and organizational 
actors. Interest groups and social movement organizations, for example, typically only focus 
their attention on particular policies. Second, most state action is conducted through government 
agencies that focus on a particular policy domain. And third, researchers that focus on policy 





 Resource mobilization theorists argue that the emergence and eventual success of interest 
groups and other organizations rely on material (and sometimes cultural) resources (Edwards, 
McCarthy, and Mataic 2018). The initial focus of resource mobilization theorists was on how 
broad societal factors such as more discretionary funds among the middle and upper class and 
more highly educated professionals are associated with the rise of social movements and 
advocacy organizations (McCarthy and Zald 1973; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Skocpol 1999, 
2000). But among both these theorists and more recently, an argument has been made that 
particular kinds of organizations, including foundations, play an important role in not only 
financially supporting interest groups but also publicly amplifying their work (Walker, 
McCarthy, and Baumgartner 2011). Scholars have recently pointed to the role foundations play 
in financing the work of interest groups, research institutes, and, more generally, policy-focused 
activities (Reckhow 2016; Reckhow and Tompkins-Stange 2018; Scott and Jabbar 2014).  
Arguments about resource mobilization are similar to arguments made by scholars in 
organization studies. They argue that the creation and subsequent survival of organizations are, 
in part, due to external support—from both state and non-state actors (Aldrich and Fiol 1994). 
Organizational ecologists argue that founding and disbanding rates are dependent on population-
level explanations, including the density—or size—of that population (Carroll and Hannan 1989; 
Hannan and Freeman 1988). Scholars have, in recent years, adapted ecologists’ arguments to 
explain interest group growth (Gray, Halpin, and Lowery 2015; Halpin 2014; Nownes 2010; 
Nownes and Neeley 1996; Stretesky et al. 2011). Therefore, I hypothesize the following: 
H1a. Interest group growth is positively associated with the presence of foundations. 
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Policy Related Factors 
Researchers have increasingly drawn attention to policies as causes rather than effects 
(Hacker and Pierson 2014; Pierson 1993). Policies create long-lasting political changes in a 
number of ways. First, they change or expand the administrative capacities of states (Skocpol 
1992). Second, policies can change the incentives, resources, goals, and identities of social and 
political groups and give rise to new challengers (Hacker 2002; Ingram, Jenness, and Meyer 
2005). And third, policies—by signaling what government is doing or ought to do and which 
citizens are deserving of government benefits—shape the kinds of mobilization and participatory 
opportunities of citizens and political organizations (Campbell 2012; Schneider and Ingram 
1993).  
Scholars have argued that the expansion of the American state, starting in the 1960s, has 
contributed to the rise of interest groups (Berry 1999; Skocpol 1999; Walker 1991). Due in part 
to the influence of social movements, Baumgartner and Mahoney (2005) argue that the federal 
government not only grew in the second half of the 20th century but that its portfolio (i.e., 
attention to issues) diversified. Increasing attention to new issues—along with new government 
agencies, new programs, more funding schemes, and more constituent demands—have all, 
according to this line of work, contributed to the rise of interest groups. 
Relatedly, researchers have argued that path dependence—the idea that early events, 
including but not limited to policy adoption—constrains options later in the process (Pierson 
2004:134). One key takeaway from this line of research is that policies have long-lasting 
consequences because they create particular kinds of organizational forms that are able to shape 
later processes and events (Pierson 2004:71). In addition to creating new forms, policies also 
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shape the opportunities—social, cultural, and financial—available to both new and old 
organizations. 
How do policies spur interest group activity? As suggested above, policies often create 
new government agencies, new programs, and new funding opportunities, and interest groups 
arise (or shift their attention) to more closely monitor—and often secure the continued expansion 
of—programs and funding streams. For example, interest group representation in education 
policy has increased substantially since the late 1960s (Schlozman 2010). Scholars have pointed 
to the passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in 1965 as a catalyzing 
event for the increase in politically active groups in education. Specifically, researchers have 
argued that the creation, soon after ESEA was passed, of over a hundred new categorical 
programs and the need for a few dozen federal agencies to oversee various funding schemes 
elevated the presence and influence of organizations interested in relatively narrow interests 
(e.g., bilingual education, the needs of gifted or disadvantaged students, etc.) (Bailey 1975; Kirst 
and Jung 1980; Peterson and Rabe 1983). This research suggests that interest group growth is in 
response to political events and policy changes, generally supporting the policy feedback 
literature. Based on the policy feedback literature, a number of hypotheses can be tested: 
H2a. Attention from Congress in the agenda-setting policy stage—in the form of Congressional 
hearings—is positively associated with interest group growth. 
H2b. The passage of laws is positively associated with interest group growth. 
H2c. The budget of a government agency or department is positively associated with interest 
group growth. 
Political Elite Attention and Competition 
Another set of explanations for interest group growth focuses less on policies and more 
on attention from and competition among political elites. A subset of these explanations argues 
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that political elites, including, most notably, presidents and political parties, drive interest group 
growth and mobilization. The evidence on the effects of elites on interest group mobilization 
suggests that presidential attention and Congressional attention may be at odds (Baumgartner et 
al. 2011). To test these potentially competing explanations, therefore, I hypothesize the 
following: 
H3a. More attention from a president is positively associated with interest group growth. 
H3b. More attention from the two major parties is positively associated with interest group 
growth. 
 Another subset focuses on elite competition and, in particular, partisanship as an 
explanatory factor for interest group mobilization. As Hojnacki et al. (2012) note, many of these 
studies focus on partisan competition in U.S. states (Crowley and Skocpol 2001; Gray, 
Cluverius, et al. 2015). But the authors also note that these studies “consistently show that party 
competition is associated with higher levels of interest mobilization” (Hojnacki et al. 2012:389). 
Similarly and drawing on social movement research, scholars have suggested that political 
contestation within a field leads to the emergence and growth of new organizational forms and 
new modes of political action (Clemens 1993; Lippmann 2007). While previous studies have 
measured partisanship as how small the difference is in the number of representatives (or voters) 
of the two major parties in a particular geographic area (typically a state in the U.S.), this does 
not make sense when policy domain is the unit of analysis. Therefore, in this chapter, 
partisanship is measured as how far apart the two parties are, based on roll call votes, in a policy 
domain. I also include the vote margin of all Congressional bills to measure how contentious 
policy domains are. (See details in the Data and Methods section below.) In summary, because 
partisanship and contention are theorized to create political uncertainty and therefore opens up 
the political arena for collective actors to engage, I am able to test the following: 
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H3c. More partisanship between the two major parties is positively associated with interest group 
growth. 
H3d. More contention in a policy domain is positively associated with interest group growth. 
Relatedly, Amenta, Caren, and Stobaugh (2012) argue that partisan regimes, ones that are 
dominated by either the right or the left, are more likely to spur political action (specifically, the 
presence and media coverage of social movement mobilization). To test this, I hypothesize the 
following: 
H3e. More unified government regimes are positively associated with interest group growth. 
H3f. High partisanship, combined with less contention in a policy domain, is more likely to be 
associated with interest group growth. 
Issue Salience 
A fourth set of explanations of interest group mobilization focuses on issue salience. 
Much of this work focuses less on the relationship between issue salience and interest group 
growth and more on how issue salience affects interest group participation (Hojnacki et al. 
2012). Nonetheless, many of these studies suggest that the more salient an issue is, the more 
likely interest groups are to engage in the policymaking process (Baumgartner 2009). 
Rasmussen, Carroll, and Lowery (2014) show that public opinion concern about a policy domain 
is associated with more interest group activity, especially on economic issues. On the other hand, 
however, Bevan (2012) shows that media attention counterintuitively leads to group competition 
and replacement rather than support and is negatively associated with interest group growth. 
Therefore, I hypothesize the following about the effects of issue salience: 
H4a. More public opinion concern is positively associated with interest group growth. 
H4b. More media attention is negatively associated with interest group growth. 
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Data and Methods 
To assess the effects that resource mobilization, policies, political elite competition, and 
issue salience have on interest group growth, I run policy domain fixed effects models, using 
data on all substantive policy domains (e.g., education, defense, environment) in the United 
States. I use the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) Major Topics coding scheme to delineate 
the substantive policy domains. The time frame of the study is from 1970 to 2005 because data 
coverage for the dependent variable—the number of interest groups—begin and end, 
respectively, at the bookends of this time period. Much of the data, discussed below in more 
detail, come from CAP’s compilation of multiple data sources. 
Dependent Variable: Interest Groups 
I use the number of interest groups in each policy domain as my dependent variable. 
These data come from the Encyclopedia of Associations (EA), a commonly used database used 
by social scientists. The EA is a directory of national-level voluntary associations operating in 
the United States and has been published annually by Gale Research since 1956. While 
researchers have used the directory extensively since the 1990s, the Comparative Agendas 
Project recently compiled and made publicly available annual counts of organizations from 1966 
to 2005. Most notably for policy research, CAP’s annual counts are broken down by policy 
domain, allowing researchers to more systematically assess the policy and political determinants 
and effects of associational activity (Bevan et al. 2013). Because the annual counts data from 
CAP include many different kinds of organizations—including hobby, cultural, technical, and 
athletic organizations—I use a more detailed dataset from CAP that includes information on each 
organization.27 I narrow in on organizations most likely to be engaged in public policy—
 
27 The first year in the more detailed dataset is 1970, compared to 1966 in the annual counts dataset.  
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including lobbying, advocacy, and service provision—by including only “Public Affairs 
Organizations” and “Social Welfare Organizations” found in CAP’s subject variable. The dataset 
has entries of associations only in years ending in 0 and 5. Therefore, I linearly interpolate, by 
policy domain, to fill the missing data. With 20 policy domains and 36 years in the dataset, the 
total number of observations for this variable is 720. Because of how skewed this variable is and 
because there are 0s in some policy domain-year observations, I transform this variable using the 




Using the Encyclopedia of Associations, I include the number of organizations that 
provide material resources to other organizations as my indicator of resource mobilization. To do 
so, I searched an organization’s name using the following keywords: “fund,” “trust,” and 
“foundation.” I also control, in my analyses, for the presence of powerful organizations that may 
not strictly be considered interest groups but that also are not, first and foremost, philanthropic 
organizations. To include these organizations, I counted organizations classified as 
“Governmental, Public Administration, Military and Legal Organizations” in the subject variable 
in the Encyclopedia of Associations dataset.  
Policy-Related and Political Elite Attention 
 
Data for policy focused independent variables also come from CAP. The project has 
compiled a list of all public laws and Congressional hearings since 1946.28 As with all CAP 
datasets, these data are broken down by policy domain. To calculate the federal budget of each 
 
28 CAP compiled these datasets using multiple sources, including the Congressional Information Service and the 
Proquest Congressional database.  
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policy domain over time, I use CAP’s Budget Authority dataset, which is based on the federal 
government’s Budget of the United States Government and that was originally compiled by 
James True. The dataset includes historical budget data, organized by functions and subfunctions 
produced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). CAP also includes a crosswalk file 
that aligns the budgetary functions with each policy domain. After merging these files, I 
calculate the total budget of all functions and subfunctions by policy domain-year. I then use the 
OMB inflator to convert all figures to 2009 dollars. CAP notes that, based on the OMB budget 
functions, there is no budget for three CAP policy domains: Macroeconomics; Immigration; and 
Civil Rights, Minority Rights, and Civil Liberties.29 This reduces the number of policy domains 
to 17, resulting in 612 total observations.  
I measure attention from political elites in two ways. The first is attention from the 
president toward a policy domain. I measure this using the number of quasi-sentences in a 
president’s State of the Union that addresses one of the 20 policy domains.30 My second elite 
attention measure is the number of quasi-sentences in the Republican and Democratic party 
platforms about of the 20 policy domains. The data were originally collected and coded by 
Christina Wolbrecht and are now updated by CAP. For each policy domain-year, I add the 
number of quasi-sentences in both parties’ platforms. Because platforms are issued and approved 
only every four years, I forward fill the number of quasi-sentences on a policy domain until the 
next platform is adopted. For example, the total number of quasi-sentences focused on 
Macroeconomics in both 1972 platforms was 189; therefore, this would also be the number of 
quasi-sentences focused on this policy domain in 1973, 1974, and 1975.  
 
29 This is because these are broad policy domains that do not have dedicated federal agencies. 
 





To assess Congressional partisanship by policy domain, I use the Voteview database 
(Lewis, Jeffrey B. et al. 2020). The database includes all Congressional roll call votes, and the 
data have often been used to calculate the ideological positions (including the often used DW-
Nominate measure) of members of Congress (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2016). In a similar 
vein, I am interested in how close the two major parties are on each policy domain. To do so, I 
first measure how partisan each roll call vote was by calculating the difference between the two 
parties’ Yea votes (as a proportion of the total party membership).31 The formula for calculating 








where 𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦 and 𝐷𝐷𝑦𝑦 are the number of Republicans and Democrats, respectively, that vote 
yes on a bill and Rnand Dn are the number of Republicans and Democrats, respectively, that vote 
no on a bill. I do this separately for House votes and for Senate votes. I then merge these 
measures with CAP’s roll call dataset (which codes each Congressional bill for which policy 
domain it relates to). Then, for each policy domain-year, I calculate the mean partisan measure—
one for the House and one for the Senate—and I then average the two to create one partisanship 
measure. In policy domain-year observations where no House or Senate bill was voted on, the 
partisan measure is coded as missing, resulting in 700 partisanship measures observations. The 
measure ranges from 0.02 (the two parties voted very similarly on bills of a policy domain in a 
given year) to 0.83 (the two parties voted very differently) and has a median of 0.34.  
 




Using the same source, I measure contention by calculating the vote margin of all 
Congressional bills. Again, I do this separately for House votes and for Senate votes and then 
merge these measures with CAP’s roll call dataset. Because of the large difference in the number 
of members in the House and Senate, I scale the vote margins for each policy domain-year and 
then average the two to create one (scaled) contention measure. The scaled measure ranges from 
0.09 (small vote margin and, therefore, more contentious) to 0.85 (high vote margin and, 
therefore, less contentious) and has a median of 0.43.  
In addition to creating a partisanship measure based on Congressional voting, I also 
measure partisanship by calculating how similarly the two parties speak about each policy 
domain in a given year. Here, I again rely on CAP’s party platforms dataset. To measure how 
similar the two parties’ platforms are on a specific policy domain, I use cosine similarity—a 
measure increasingly used by social scientists to calculate the similarity of texts (Evans, Gomez, 
and McFarland 2016; Nowlin 2016). For each policy domain-year (e.g., Environment in 1972), I 
create two “bags of words”: one that combines all of the words used in the GOP platform 
focused on environmental issues in the 1972 platform, and another that does the same for the 
Democratic party platform. I then calculate the cosine similarity of these two “bags of words.” In 
short, cosine similarity is a measure of how similar two texts are (in this case, the text pertaining 
to environmental issues in 1972 in both the Republican and Democratic platforms) based on the 
occurrence of overlapping words in those documents, irrespective of how long those two texts 
are (Jurafsky and Martin 2019:103–4). The higher the measure, the more similar (i.e., less 
partisan) the two parties are on the policy domain in that year. To fill in the gaps between 
presidential election years, I forward fill this measure until the next platform is adopted.  
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I also take into account whether the government is divided in any given year (Mayhew 
2005). In my analyses, divided party control of the legislative and executive branches is coded 1, 
while unified control is coded 0. 
Issue Salience 
 
I assess the effects of issue salience in my analyses by including two measures: the 
public’s concern about a policy domain and media attention to that policy domain. To assess the 
effect of public concern, I include CAP’s calculations of Gallup’s Most Important Problem 
question, an open-ended question that has been asked since the 1950s about what policy domains 
most concern Americans. I then include a normalized measure of this variable for each policy 
domain-year. I measure media attention to a policy domain with the New York Times Index, also 
broken down by year and domain by CAP. This measure gives me an estimate of the number of 
stories on each policy domain for each 100,000 articles in the New York Times in a given year. 
Summary statistics of all variables are provided in Table 1. Time trends of a few key variables, 
broken down by policy domain, are provided in the Appendix. 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics, Policy Domain-Year, 1970-2005  
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max 
Interest Groups 720 131.42 179.83 0 44.8 797 
Interest Groups (Inv. Hyperbolic Sine) 720 4.65 1.48 0.00 4.50 7.37 
Foundations, Funds, and Trusts 720 37.83 48.08 0 21.8 308 
Legal and Administrative Organizations 720 29.94 37.97 0 16.5 225 
Laws 720 14.05 18.60 0 8 140 
Hearings 720 80.81 53.17 2 68 349 
Sentences in President's State of the Union 720 10.86 17.49 0 3 150 
Sentences in Both Parties' Party Platforms 720 114.22 99.81 2 85 592 
Partisanship Measure - Roll Call Votes 700 0.36 0.15 0.02 0.34 0.83 
Scaled Roll Call Vote Margin 700 0.44 0.12 0.09 0.43 0.85 
Cosine Similarity of Two Parties' Party Platforms 720 0.36 0.16 0.00 0.35 0.78 
Divided Government 720 0.75 0.43 0 1 1 
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Normed Public Opinion Salience 720 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.79 
Weighted Number of NYT Articles (per 100,000) 720 40.10 53.68 0.00 20.27 339.16 
Federal Budget, in Billions USD (2009 Dollars) 612 96.79 160.61 -1.45 36.10 982.09  
Results 
 Figure 1 shows the dramatic increase in the number of interest groups from 1970 to 2005 
and that the fastest growth in this sector occurred in the 10-15 years after 1980. What explains 
the growth of these organizations? Before turning to the multivariable regression analyses, I 
show bivariate relationships in the correlation matrix in table 2. The pairwise correlations 
suggest that no two variables are so highly correlated to be concerned about multicollinearity in 
the regression analyses. Substantively, the table suggests that many of the independent variables, 
including the resource mobilization measures, Congressional hearings, and attention from 
political elites, are significantly statistically correlated with the number of interest groups. I now 
turn to the fixed effects models, breaking up my analysis into the four subsets of independent 
variables (resource mobilization, policy-related and political attention, partisanship, and issue 
salience). All independent variables are lagged by one year.  
 
  
Table 3.2: Correlation Matrix 






































Number of NYT 
Articles (per 
100,000) 
Interest Groups                           
Fndns, Funds, and 
Trusts 0.48
***                         
Legal and Admin 
Orgs 0.51
*** 0.12**                       
Laws 0.30*** 0.13** 0.13**                     
Hearings 0.50*** 0.39*** 0.28*** 0.52***                   
Fed. Budget, in 
Billions USD (2009 
Dollars) 
0.20*** 0.07 0.02 -0.01 0.05                 
Sentences in 
President's State of 
the Union 
0.48*** 0.33*** 0.20*** 0.01 0.30*** 0.28***               
Sentences in Both 
Parties' Party 
Platforms 
0.61*** 0.33*** 0.30*** 0.02 0.31*** 0.24*** 0.55***             
Partisanship 
Measure - Roll Call 
Votes 
0.11** 0.19*** 0.07 -0.12** -0.03 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.01           
Scaled Contention 
Measure - Roll Call 
Votes 
-0.17*** -0.14*** -0.08 -0.15*** -0.16
*** -0.00 -0.01 -0.10* 0.63***         
Divided Gov’t -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 0.05 -0.03 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02 -0.16*** -0.03       
Normed Public 
Opinion Salience 0.35
*** 0.27*** 0.44*** 0.08 0.24*** 0.37*** 0.40*** 0.43*** 0.11** -0.03 -0.03     
Weighted No. of 
NYT Articles (per 
100,000) 
0.31*** 0.20*** 0.32*** 0.11** 0.38*** -0.14*** 0.20*** 0.28*** -0.19*** -0.12** 0.06 0.16***   




Table 3.3: Fixed Effects Models of Interest Group Growth, 1970-2005  
 Dependent variable:   
 Number of Interest Groups (Inv. Hyperbolic Sine) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
Foundations, Funds, and Trusts 0.01***    0.004*** 
 (0.001)    (0.001)       
Legal and Administrative Orgs. 0.01***    0.01*** 
 (0.002)    (0.002)       
Laws  -0.004*   -0.0002 
  (0.002)   (0.002)       
Hearings  0.002**   0.002** 
  (0.001)   (0.001)       
Sentences in President's State of the Union  0.001   -0.003** 
  (0.002)   (0.001)       
Sentences - Both Parties' Party Platforms  0.001**   0.001 
  (0.0004)   (0.0004)       
Normed Public Opinion Salience   0.92**  0.10 
   (0.35)  (0.32)       
Weighted No. of NYT Articles (per 100,000)   -0.01***  -0.002*** 
   (0.001)  (0.001)       
Partisanship Measure - Roll Call Votes    2.79*** 1.14*** 
    (0.16) (0.33)       
Scaled Roll Call Vote Margin    2.01*** 0.72* 
    (0.20) (0.29)       
Cosine Sim. of Two Parties' Party Platforms    -0.28 -0.32* 
    (0.14) (0.16)       
Divided Government    -0.002 0.03 
    (0.04) (0.04)       
Partisanship X Vote Margin     1.91* 
     (0.80)        
Number of Policy Domains 20 20 20 20 20 
Policy Domain Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 700 700 700 680 680 
R2 0.31 0.04 0.12 0.32 0.43 
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.01 0.09 0.29 0.40 
F Statistic 149.77*** 7.42*** 45.04*** 76.35*** 36.86***  
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 




Table 3 includes all models together, and models 1 in that table focuses specifically on 
the effects of resources on the increase in the number of organizations. Model 1 shows that the 
number of two types of organizations (funding organizations and legal/administrative 
organizations) are highly correlated, at the 0.001 level, with the number of interest groups. 
Model 2 includes only policy-related and political attention measures, and the results show that 
two measures (number of Congressional hearings and number of sentences in both political 
parties’ platforms) are positively associated with the number of interest groups. In this model, the 
number of passed laws is negatively associated with the number of interest groups.  
Model 3 in table 3 shows the effects of issue salience on the number of interest groups. 
The model indicates that public concern about a policy domain is positively and statistically 
associated, at the 0.01 level, with the growth of interest groups. As for media attention, the 
results from model 5 show a strong, negative association between the normed number of New 
York Times articles and organizational growth.  
 Next, model 4 in table 3 assesses the effects of political partisanship on the growth of 
interest groups. Two independent variables are statistically associated with interest group 
numbers. High partisanship (as measured by roll call votes) and roll call vote margin are both 
positively associated with organizational growth. The full model (5) in table 3 includes all 
variables and largely confirms the results from the earlier models. The effects of resource 
mobilization are still positively associated, at the 0.001 level, with interest group growth. The 
number of hearings is also still positively associated, at the 0.01 level with interest group growth. 
The number of laws, attention from the president, and attention from both parties are inconsistent 
from previous models and the full model, suggesting that these variables are not strongly 
associated with interest group growth.  
86 
 
The issue salience variables in the full model show that public concern about a policy 
domain is no longer significant, but media attention is still negatively associated, at the 0.001 
level, with the growth of interest groups. As for the effects of partisanship, the full model again 
suggests that political partisanship has an especially strong association with organizational 
growth. In particular, the farther apart Congressional members of the two major parties are on 
Congressional bills and the less similar the two parties’ platforms are (as denoted by a low cosine 
similarity measure), the higher the number of interest groups. The roll call partisanship measure 
is statistically significant at the 0.001 level, while the party platform similarity measure is 
marginally significant at the 0.05 level.  
In the full model, I also create a measure that serves as a proxy for partisan dominance at 
the policy domain level. To do so, I create an interaction term between the roll call partisanship 
measure and the vote margin measure. High values on this interaction term would be a proxy for 
a policy domain, in a given year, in which partisanship is high but contention is low, a 
combination that would be indicative of partisan dominance by one party or the other. The term 
is positively and statistically associated with interest group growth at the 0.05 level, suggesting 
that partisan dominance in a highly partisan environment is another predictor of increased 
mobilization.  
Finally, because the budget variable excludes three policy domains—Macroeconomics; 
Civil Rights, Minority Rights, and Civil Liberties; and Immigration—I also ran the full model 
with the budget variable that excludes these three policy domains (not shown). The new variable, 
the federal budget of a policy domain, has a null effect on interest group growth and there are no 
substantive changes from the main models presented above.  
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Discussion and Conclusions 
Using data on all policy domains in the United States in the time period 1970-2005, I 
tested the effects of resource mobilization, policies and political elite attention, partisanship, and 
issue salience on the growth of interest groups. The findings in this chapter suggest that the two 
main set of factors that explain interest group growth are resource mobilization and political 
partisanship. Before discussing the implications of these findings, I first summarize what I found 
to be the effects of the four broad factors on interest group growth.  
First, the presence of resources, both material (in the form of foundations and similar 
organizations) and political (in the form of legal and administrative organizations), was robustly 
and positively associated (in models 1 and 5 in table 3) with the number of interest groups in a 
policy domain.  
Second, the findings in this chapter suggest that not all policy or political elite attention 
factors are associated with interest group growth and, in fact, some are negatively associated 
with growth. The only variable in this set of factors that was consistently and positively 
associated with interest group growth was the number of Congressional hearings, confirming 
previous work on the effect of agenda-setting attention on mobilization (Baumgartner and 
Mahoney 2005). The effects of public law passage and attention from either the president or the 
two political parties were inconclusive. Taken together with the other findings above, these 
findings suggest that attention from Congress (and specifically from Congressional committees, 
which drive the agenda) constitutes the main kind of signal that drives interest groups to 
mobilize.  
The effect of law passage was consistently negatively associated (and, in model 2, 
statistically significantly so) with interest group growth, contradicting some previous studies on 
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the effects of policies (including laws) on collective action toward and public attention to an 
issue. (In a similar vein, the budget variable also had a null effect on interest group growth.) 
What explains this potential contradiction? I offer three potential explanations. First, it is 
possible that potential interest groups are more responsive to a bundle of policymaking tools, 
which includes not just policy passage but Congressional hearings, attention from political 
parties, etc. So, while laws may not appear significant in a multivariable regression, its effects 
may be masked by other parts of the policy process. The bivariate correlation between hearings 
and laws (a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.52) confirms this suspicion.  
Relatedly, a second explanation for the lack of an effect of laws on interest group growth 
is that many previous studies (notably ones about Medicare or Social Security) focused on large, 
notable pieces of legislation that set in motion a number of other changes (including building up 
administrative capacity, increasing the federal budget toward that issue, etc.) that also explain the 
growth of interest groups in that policy domain. This long-term effect would not be captured in 
the relatively short timeframe analysis done here. Further, the number of laws measure used for 
the analysis in this chapter includes many laws that may be relatively unimportant and would be 
unlikely to drive collective action. Finally, a third explanation for the null and negative 
association finding is that laws may be a signal to interest groups that the government is 
responding to their issues of concern—dampening the growth of the sector. In particular, the 
passage of laws after Congress has paid a lot of attention to an issue or after much debate has 
occurred would be less likely to spur collective action than if those laws had been passed earlier 
in the process.  
The third set of explanations for interest group growth focuses on political partisanship 
and, in these analyses, provides a lot of explanatory power for why the number of interest 
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groups, across multiple policy domains, grew considerably from 1970 to 2005. The findings 
provide strong evidence that political partisanship—the further apart the two main political 
parties are on the issues—drives organizational growth. In all three models in which it was 
included, the partisanship measure that is based on roll votes had a consistently strong 
association with organizational growth. In other words, the further apart the two parties voted on 
House and Senate bills focused on a policy domain, the higher the number of interest groups in 
the following year. Similarly, in two of the three models, the further apart the two parties are on 
the language they use in their platforms, the higher the organizational growth in the following 
year. These findings suggest that highly partisan and, therefore, competitive policy domains 
likely provide a signal to potential interest groups that their work may shape that domain. 
I go one step further with the partisanship analyses to test the proposition that partisan 
regimes—a combination of a highly partisan environment and one in which one party is more 
dominant—drive collective action. While this argument has been made using data at a macro 
level (i.e., time periods in recent history where a party controlled the presidency and Congress 
and where the two main parties differed on policy issues generally speaking), my analyses, at the 
policy domain level, allow me to measure partisan regime at a more fine-grained level. In other 
words, the main question is whether policy domains where there is high partisanship and where 
the agenda is dominated by one party is associated with interest group growth. Based on the 
interaction term in model 5 in table 3, partisan dominance is associated with interest group 
growth. This finding confirms the intuition that partisan dominance, especially in a highly 
partisan environment, does not simply spur collective action by those that support the current 




The fourth and final set of possible explanations for interest group growth is issue 
salience. Previous work on this question has been inconclusive and much of it has not established 
a direct link between salience and mobilization. The findings from my analyses suggest that, 
similarly, the link between public concern over a policy domain and the number of interest 
groups working in that domain is weak. While I found some support that public concern was 
positively associated with interest groups in model 3 in table 3, the relationship between these 
two variables was statistically insignificant in the full models (model 5 in table 3). On the other 
hand, there was a consistent and strong negative association between media attention and interest 
group growth in all models that included the media attention variable. As Bevan suggests, this 
may be because attention from the media creates more group competition rather than support for 
existing and nascent groups. Further, I argue that this finding may suggest that the causal arrow 
of the relationship between the two should be reversed. Interest groups, as my other findings 
show, are often responding to resources in the environment, policy changes, and political 
partisanship and may be less concerned about how often a policy issue or domain is being 
covered by media outlets. Instead, interest groups likely drive media attention on a policy 
domain. These groups are often sources of information, both for policymakers and for media 
outlets (Berry and Portney 2014). Therefore, high attention from the media on a policy domain is 
most likely to represent a time period after the sector has grown considerably and in which 
growth has slowed or plateaued, potentially explaining the negative association found in the 
results.  
The findings from this chapter buttress the arguments I make in chapters 2 and 4 about 
the transformation of education policy from the 1960s to the 1990s. As appendix figure 1 
illustrates, partisanship in education policy increased substantially in the early 1980s and, despite 
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notable bipartisan agreement on major legislation, steadily rose in the ensuing two decades. 
Further, as I show in chapter 2 (in figure 2), the number of hearings on education increased 
substantially in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, and the presence of government 
agencies and foundations in education policy (especially in funding research) was also prominent 
in this time period. These three factors in education policy—increasing partisanship, attention 
from Congress, and support from both government and non-governmental sources—largely 
mirror the most important factors in this chapter’s quantitative analyses in explaining interest 
group growth. As I show in chapter 4 and as others have noted (Schlozman 2010), the number—
and influence—of interest groups in education has in fact increased substantially since the 1980s 
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CHAPTER FOUR: EFFECTIVENESS IN THE SERVICE OF EQUALITY: PARADIGM 
BRIDGING AND THE PASSAGE OF MAJOR LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Abstract 
What role do policy paradigms play in legislative change? Focusing on two dominant and 
competing paradigms in American politics—equality and effectiveness—I analyze the text of all 
public laws from 1973 to 1994 to assess the effect that each of the two paradigms has on major 
legislation. Using word embedding models, I find that laws—especially in social policy 
domains—that engage with both paradigms are more likely to be major pieces of legislation than 
laws that only engage with one or the other. I then use education policy as a case study to show 
that one explanation for this finding is that interest groups that were best at combining and 
focusing on these two contradictory paradigms were more likely to be part of the agenda-setting 
process (e.g., organizations that testified at Congressional hearings) of an important policy 
change in the mid-1990s and were influential in shaping the Democratic Party’s newfound 
support for standards-based reforms in education. The findings in this chapter suggest that major 
legislative change in the United States is more likely when collective actors use paradigm 
bridging—integrating multiple ideas together—rather than focusing on one paradigm.   
 





Scholars have increasingly focused on the role of ideas in the policymaking process. 
Based on the view that policymaking is a “form of collective puzzlement” (Heclo 1974:305–7) 
and a conflict over problem definitions and proposed solutions, there has been renewed interest 
in the role that ideas—above and beyond electoral outcomes, interest groups, and administrative 
capacity—play in shaping policy outcomes (Béland 2005; Béland and Cox 2011; Berman 2013; 
Berman and Pagnucco 2010; Campbell 2002; Hall 1993; Schmidt 2010). Researchers have 
shown that how ideas are framed and discussed, by whom, and in what institutional settings have 
an effect on policy changes—including in foreign policy and international affairs, 
macroeconomic policies, and social policies (Baumgartner, Boydstun, and De Boef 2008; Blyth 
2002; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Hall 1989; Heikkila et al. 2014; Kangas, Niemelä, and 
Varjonen 2014; Skrentny 1996). 
While scholars have made much headway in explaining the ways ideas shape 
policymaking, the association between the content of ideas and legislative change is less clear. In 
particular, while scholars have noted the importance of paradigms—what Campbell (1998:385) 
defines as the background assumptions political elites hold that constrain their proposed 
solutions—it is unclear how and which paradigms shape policy change. In this chapter, I focus 
specifically on two paradigms in American politics that have been prevalent since the 1960s. The 
first is that policymaking—especially in social policy domains such as education, healthcare, and 
social security—should address socioeconomic and historical inequities. The second, ascendant 
since the 1970s and relying on neoclassical economics, sees most government intervention as 
undermining market forces and largely as ineffective in addressing social and economic 
problems. If the government is to be involved at all, it should do so to promote efficiency and 
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reward individuals and businesses for their efforts (Campbell 1998; Centeno and Cohen 2012; 
Mudge 2008). And above else, proponents of this second paradigm argue that government 
policies should be effective and—using performance-based measures—should be held to 
account. For the sake of simplicity, I label the former the equality paradigm and the latter the 
effectiveness paradigm. Briefly, using the text summaries of the 682 social policy bills that were 
signed into law from 1973 to 1994, I find that major pieces of legislation were more likely to 
engage with both paradigms than with one or the other.  
What explains this finding? I use education policy as a case study to argue that interest 
groups were particularly adept at bridging these two paradigms. Most notably, organizations that 
bridged these two paradigms were more likely than organizations that only focused on one or the 
other to influence the policymaking process in the leadup to the passage of the most important 
education legislation in at least two decades—the Improving America’s Schools Act (IASA), 
passed in 1994. I show that, more so than traditional measures of power—e.g., network position 
or financial support—paradigm bridging had the most significant effect on this legislative 
change. In short, my findings challenge theorists’ views of institutional change by showing that 
change does not only come about from powerful political coalitions, critical junctures, or shifting 
cultural norms. Instead, ideas and the ways they are used by organizations often lead to major 
institutional (and, in this case, legislative) change (Berman 2013; Schmidt 2010). This hinges on 
viewing power as emanating not simply from an actors’ network positions, material resources, or 
strategic interests but also from their ideas (Lukes 2005; Weber 1915).  
Literature Review 
In this chapter, I focus on two overarching questions. First, to what degree do policy 
paradigms shape the policymaking process? And second, how does the framing of policy 
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paradigms by collective actors effect legislative change? To address the first question, the review 
below highlights a central tension found in much of the literature on policy ideas. Do ideas, in 
and of themselves, have an effect on policy decisions? Or do traditional measures of power—
including resource mobilization and connections with other organizations in a coalition—explain 
much of the reason that ideas have only an indirect effect on policymaking? To address the 
second overarching question of the chapter—about the framing of policy paradigms—I draw on 
social movement studies below to highlight another theoretical tension. What kinds of framing 
mechanisms lead to social and political change? More specifically and in the context of this 
chapter, is legislative change more likely when collective actors focus on one paradigm or is it 
more likely when they focus on combining paradigms—or paradigm bridging?  
In the last section of the review below, I turn to education policy and focus on the 
dominant explanations given by scholars of how major legislative changes came about in this 
policy domain in the United States. Mirroring the two major questions posed in this chapter, 
scholars have debated why major changes came about in education policy in the 1990s and early 
2000s. Did these changes come about mostly because of the influence of powerful interests or 
did the ideas that had emerged in the decades prior play a significant role? If the latter, were 
those legislative changes a result of a new paradigm that had emerged in the 1980s—one focused 
on standards and accountability—or was it because two paradigms had been combined in a way 
that was appealing to policymakers?   
Ideas, Interests, and Policymaking 
Why do some ideas and, in particular, paradigms effect policy change while others do not 
(Berman 2001; Mehta 2011)? One broad set of explanations argues that ideas win out when they 
are seen as administratively and politically viable. More specifically, ideas need the backing of 
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powerful interest groups, political leaders, or political coalitions (Hall 1989; Kingdon 1984). A 
variant of this explanation relegates the independent effect of ideas, viewing a successful idea as 
mostly a reflection of the interests of powerful economic or political elites (Domhoff 2010). 
Although they do not focus on the effect of ideas on policy change, Gilens and Page (2014) test 
the effects that public opinion, economic elite preferences, and interest groups (both mass-based 
and business groups) have on policy changes from 1981 to 2002 in the United States. They find 
that, while mass-based interest groups have some effect on policy change, the strongest 
predictors are the preferences of economic elites and business interest groups.  
In contrast to interest-based explanations, another set of explanations draws on historical 
institutionalism and focuses on the ways in which political institutions—including policies, 
informal norms, and bureaucratic practices—are constraining (Hacker and Pierson 2014). 
Because policy regimes and institutions are viewed as relatively stable, ideas are most likely to 
effect policy change during an exogenous shock (e.g., war or an economic crisis) or “critical 
junctures” (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007; McNamara 1998).  
Researchers have highlighted two main critiques of these two broad explanations. The 
first, mostly aimed at interest-based explanations, argues that ideas do not simply reflect the 
interests of powerful political and economic elites and often have independent effects on 
policymaking (Béland 2005; Berman 1998; Blyth 2002). A second critique argues against a view 
of institutions, both political and socio-cultural, as being overly constraining. Institutional change 
often happens slowly and does not require exogenous shocks (Mahoney and Thelen 2009). This 
critique opens up the possibility of legislative change occurring because of endogenous processes 
and through actors actively shaping policy ideas rather than simply being constrained by them 
(Schmidt 2008; Sewell 1992).  
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Framing and Change 
The focus on agentic actors using ideas to shape cultural, social, and political outcomes 
draws, in part, on the framing literature in social movement studies. As opposed to the view that 
movements emerge and succeed because of either political opportunities or resource 
mobilization, framing theorists argue that scholars should focus on how movement organizations 
articulate, extend, and adapt collective action frames (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow et al. 
1986).  
Two debates in the framing literature are worth noting. The first is a critique of framing 
as too broad of a concept. Most notably, Oliver and Johnston (2000:38–39) criticize the framing 
literature for often conflating frames with ideology. The latter, they argue, comprises a coherent 
system of ideas and values that is better, than framing, at explaining social and political change. 
In a similar vein, Campbell (1998) proposes four kinds of policy ideas—paradigms, programs, 
frames, and public sentiments—and argues that each has different effects on policymaking (cf. 
Hall 1993; Mehta 2011). For example, whereas frames are used by political elites to justify their 
proposed policy solutions, paradigms serve as background, core frameworks that constrain the 
range of policy solutions to policymakers (Campbell and Pedersen 2014:10). 
A second question in the framing literature is more recent theoretical work on what kinds 
of framing mechanisms lead to cultural and social change. Snow, Tan, and Owens (2013), for 
example, have argued that movement organizations contribute to social and cultural change in 
one of two ways. The first, frame articulation, connects different issues, topics, or ideologies in 
an “integrated and meaningful fashion.” In contrast, frame elaboration is when movements or 
organizations highlight a topic or issue at the expense of others (Snow et al. 2013:229, 232). 
When investigating the effects of framing, researchers have tended to focus on frame 
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elaboration—essentially asking which frames shape public opinion or policy changes 
(Baumgartner et al. 2008; Heikkila et al. 2014; Kangas et al. 2014; Pizmony-Levy and Ponce 
2013) or under which political or discursive opportunity structures frames succeed (McCammon 
2012; McCammon et al. 2007). Less research has focused on the effect of frame articulation, or 
combination, on policy outcomes.  
In summary, the challenge for scholars interested in the role of ideas in policymaking has 
shifted from asking whether ideas matter to showing empirically how ideas matter (Mehta 2011; 
Schmidt 2010). In this chapter, I show how ideas matter to policymaking by addressing two 
central questions. First, do ideas have an independent effect on major legislative change? 
Second, I extend the concepts of articulation and elaboration from the framing literature to other 
kinds of policy ideas (in this case, paradigms) to ask whether paradigm articulation or paradigm 
elaboration is more likely to lead to major legislative change. Empirically, I address these 
questions by examining the prevalence of two dominant paradigms—equality and 
effectiveness—in legislative language and the ways in which organizations were using these 
paradigms.  
Explanations of Legislative Change in U.S. Education Policy 
Scholars have written considerably about major legislative changes in education policy of 
the 1990s and early 2000s. Education scholars have focused a considerable amount of attention 
on 2001’s No Child Left Behind (NCLB), in particular because it required states to have 
performance measures, monitor their yearly progress, and sanction schools and districts if they 
underperformed (McDermott 2011:5). Much of the spirit and language of NCLB, however, can 
be found in the Improving America’s Schools Act (IASA), passed in 1994. The passage of IASA 
represented a break from past federal policy in a couple of ways. In the past, federal programs 
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aimed at Title I students (i.e., “disadvantaged students”) were distinct from non-Title I students, 
and before 1988, all reauthorization bills of the original Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act of 1965 did not explicitly have as a goal the academic improvement of Title I students.  
In short, past education policy focused on the needs of disadvantaged students and the 
programs and funds that could address them (i.e., inputs), not how well they achieved 
academically (i.e., outputs). This changed somewhat in 1988’s reauthorization of ESEA, when 
the bill explicitly stated that improving Title I students’ achievement of “basic and more 
advanced skills” was a goal of the program (Manna 2006:73). Six years later, IASA deepened 
this goal. Congress made it explicit that disadvantaged students should meet high standards. It 
also said that they could and should do so in a school’s regular programs, not ones set aside for 
Title I students (McDonnell 2005:30).  
IASA did not just expect that Title I students should meet the standards set by states of all 
students. It also changed, quite markedly, the goal of Title I, a section of ESEA that, since 1965, 
was geared toward disadvantaged students. Congress, in 1994, made it explicit that the goal was 
to ensure that all students meet state standards “expected of all children.” Congress required that 
states participating in Title I develop standards for all children and that they should test them a 
number of times during their schooling (Manna 2006:74–75; McDermott 2011:8). 
What explains the success of these standards-based reforms, as reflected in the passage of 
IASA (and later NCLB)? Some researchers, drawing on rational choice theories, have argued 
that parties changed their strategies to align with voters’ preferences (Debray 2006; McGuinn 
2006). Others have argued that states had already begun standards-based reforms and that federal 
policymakers “borrowed” from early-adopter states (Manna 2006). And yet others have focused 
on the strength, and weakness, of particular interest groups in the field of education policy. 
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Specifically, scholars have argued that interest groups, mostly business groups, were 
instrumental in pushing for standards-based reform (Brown 2015; Debray 2006). 
Most explanations of IASA’s and NCLB’s adoption acknowledge, to varying degrees, the 
importance of the publication, in 1983, of A Nation at Risk. In short, this report elevated the 
importance of education policy in the minds of both voters and policymakers, legitimized the 
ongoing reform efforts of states, and provided an opening for business groups and conservative 
think tanks to highlight the link between academic achievement and economic competitiveness. 
Mehta (2013b), more than other scholars, argues that it was the ideas themselves—namely that 
standards would address the problems of bad educational outcomes and unaccountable schools—
that explain the policy changes of the 1990s and 2000s. While these ideas had been discussed 
and promoted (and implemented, to some degree, at the state level) before A Nation at Risk, the 
report’s publication and the subsequent paradigm shift shaped politics for decades to come 
(Mehta 2013a).  
The competing explanations among scholars about major legislative changes in U.S. 
education policy provide a good case study to answer the bigger question about the role of ideas 
in policymaking. Two overarching debates among education policy scholars are particularly 
relevant. First, to what degree did ideas matter, not just for politics more generally but for major 
legislative changes (e.g., IASA’s passage in 1994)? And second, were those legislative changes a 
consequence of a major paradigm shift—a shift from one focused on equity to one focused on 
accountability (McGuinn 2006)—or was it a result of a combination of the two paradigms—i.e., 
accountability for the sake of equity (McDermott 2011)?  
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Data and Analytic Plan 
Paradigms and Significant Legislation 
The analysis in this chapter proceeds in two steps. In the first, I assess the effects that two 
dominant and competing paradigms in American politics—equality and effectiveness—have on 
the passage of major public laws from 1973 to 1994. In the second (discussed in the next 
section), I use both quantitative and qualitative evidence to show how the paradigms discussed 
by education interest groups shaped the passage of the Improving America’s Schools Act of 
1994.  
For the first set of analyses, I collect data on Congressional bills from three sources. First, 
I use the Congressional Bills Project, a database of bills introduced in the U.S. Congress since 
1947 (Adler and Wilkerson n.d.). From this database, I include proposed legislation introduced 
in either the House of Representatives or the Senate, and I exclude those that the Congressional 
Bills Project flags as being minor bills.32 To measure the significance of passed bills, I use a 
second source—the Significant Legislation dataset (Clinton and Lapinski 2006). The creators of 
this dataset, building on earlier work by Mayhew (2005), use an integrated item-response model 
of various contemporaneous and retrospective evaluations of legislation to estimate the 
significance of all public laws enacted from 1877 to 1994. In the time period used for my 
analyses, from 1973 to 1994, the significant legislation measure ranges from -2.79 to 1.70. For 
reference, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981—President Reagan’s major tax cuts—was 
classified in the dataset (with a significance score of 1.70) as the most significant law of the 
1980s and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990—the Bush administration’s revisions to the 
 
32 Using keyword searches, the Congressional Bills Project created a variable that flags bills that are minor, 
including ones that name buildings, transfer plots of land, etc. 
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Clean Air Act—was classified as the most significant law of that administration and of the early 
1990s (with a significance score of 0.92). The Improving America’s Schools Act, with a score of 
0.216, was considered to be more significant than 96 percent of the 6,663 bills passed from 1973 
to 1994.   
I rely on a third source to collect text summaries of all Congressional bills, starting with 
the 93rd Congress (1973-1974). While full text of Congressional bills is readily available for 
bills introduced in the 103rd Congress (1993-1994) and on, only text summaries—written by 
legislative analysts in the Congressional Research Service—are available for bills before 1993.33 
The text summaries I use for my analysis were generated by the Sunlight Foundation and are 
hosted online by ProPublica.34 After downloading these files, I created a dataset of text 
summaries of bills introduced since 1973 and merged them with both the Congressional Bills 
Project and Significant Legislation datasets.  
Next, I use the bill summaries to measure the degree to which each proposed bill engages 
with one of nine focal concepts prevalent in politics and policymaking. I drew on both 
knowledge of the specific case (i.e., American politics) and from the coding scheme used by the 
Manifesto Project, which provides researchers with the policy positions of over 1,000 parties in 
over 50 countries (Volkens et al. 2020).35 Because I am interested in measuring paradigms, I 
chose focal concepts that were relatively broad, could apply to many policy domains, and likely 
 
33 See https://www.congress.gov/help/legislative-glossary/#glossary_billsummary.  
 
34 The data are available at both https://github.com/unitedstates/congress/wiki and 
https://www.propublica.org/datastore/dataset/congressional-data-bulk-legislation-bills.  
 
35 Researchers at the Manifesto Project have coded over 2,600 electoral platforms of political parties. For each 
sentence of a platform, the researchers classify the content of that sentence into one of four major categories and 
dozens of sub-categories. I did not use any of the specific codes, but I did scan them to help me narrow in on my 




to capture underlying assumptions that guide politics and policymaking. The nine focal concepts 
I chose were: Equality, Access, Efficiency, Discrimination, Effectiveness, Freedom, 
Opportunity, Competition, and Dependence. 
I then use word embeddings to measure the degree to which each Congressional bill 
engages with one of these focal concepts. Word embeddings is a machine learning technique that 
shows the semantic relationship between words. In contrast to a “bag of words” approach, the 
importance and meaning of a word is determined by where it is in relationship to others in a 
semantic space. Recently, researchers have used word embeddings models to show how texts 
engage with different concepts—including gender, ethnicity, and class—over time (Evans 2019; 
Garg et al. 2018). For example, Garg et al. (2018) used word embeddings to show how gender 
and ethnic biases have changed over time by quantifying the most common adjectives to describe 
women and the top occupations associated with different ethnic groups.  
Researchers that use word embeddings are often interested in the ways that different 
words are related to other words in a large corpus of text (e.g., millions of books, Wikipedia 
entries). But, often, the relevant question is not how words relate to each other, but how similar 
documents are to each other, or as in the case of this chapter, how similar a document (i.e., a 
Congressional bill) is to a concept (i.e., a paradigm). Building on Word Mover’s Distance, a 
function that uses word embeddings to measure how far words in one document need to “travel” 
to words of another document (Kusner et al. 2015), Stoltz and Taylor (2019) developed a 
technique that uses word embeddings to estimate the relationship between a document and a 
focal concept (or, what they call, a “pseudo-document”).  
In practice, the concept distance technique first compiles, based on a pre-trained corpus 
of texts, the words most similar to the focal concept (in the case of this chapter, this would be the 
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nine aforementioned paradigms, or focal concepts). Then, for each document (in this case, a 
Congressional bill), it measures, based on the words in that document, how close, again based on 
the pre-trained corpus, that document is to the words most associated with the focal concept. The 
advantage of this technique is that similarity of a document to a focal concept is not based, as in 
the “bag of words” approach, on counting pre-defined words. Instead, word embeddings and, in 
turn, concept distance, cast a wider net based on the relationship of words to each other. 
Using this concept distance technique,36 I measure the distance that each Congressional 
bill is from each of the nine focal concepts. For the descriptive statistics and analyses, I only 
include the distance of each bill to the two dominant paradigms—equality and effectiveness—
that I focus on in this chapter.37 I scale the concept distance measure for each Congressional 
session, and, because the scaled measure is hard to interpret, I create a dummy variable that 
denotes a Congressional bill engages with a focal concept (Concept Above Median=1) if its 
concept distance is above the median distance to that focal concept of all Congressional bills.  
Changes in Education Policy 
To assess the effects of interest groups’ use of different paradigms, I focus on two major 
changes of the early 1990s: the passage of IASA (discussed above) and the Democratic Party’s 
embrace of standards and accountability in education, which scholars have argued was crucial 
for IASA’s (and later NCLB’s) passage (Debray 2006; McGuinn 2006). I now turn to the sources 
 
36 The underlying functions and code for this technique can be found at https://github.com/dustinstoltz/CMDist. 
 
37 These two paradigms, I argue, are not only the most dominant in American policymaking but they also 
encapsulate many of the other focal concepts I measured. To test this assumption, I ran factor analysis of the bills 
dataset that included the nine focal concept distance measures and, indeed, found that equality, along with access, 
discrimination, and opportunity, “hung together” very well, and, similarly, effectiveness, along with efficiency and 
competition, were highly correlated and constituted an underlying latent variable. (Freedom and dependence were 
less clear-cut in the factor analysis.) The factor analysis validated the notion that equality and effectiveness are 1) 
separate paradigms, and 2) capture two underlying and fairly broad assumptions about politics and policymaking.  
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I use to quantitively assess the effects of paradigm bridging on IASA’s passage, and I marshal 
qualitative evidence in the Results section to show how two reform campaigns of the early 1990s 
used paradigm bridging that shaped the language used by the Democratic Party. 
Paradigm Bridging and the Passage of IASA 
 
To understand how the use of different paradigms contributed to the passage of IASA, I 
first compile a list of interest groups (including teachers’ associations) that were active in 
education policy in the leadup to the passage of the bill in 1994. To do so, I use the Education 
Resources Information Center’s (ERIC) database. ERIC is a research repository that has been in 
place since 1964 and is currently run by the Department of Education’s Institute of Education 
Sciences. The ERIC database includes an abstract of the research report, journal article, or 
opinion piece and, if available, the institution(s) that wrote the article and funding sponsor.38 
Narrowing down to articles in ERIC before 1995 with at least one institutional affiliation 
(N=177,624), I code each unique institution (N=17,324) for organizational type. Broadly 
speaking, organizations in ERIC include government agencies (both federal and state), local 
districts and schools, universities (including university-affiliated centers), and professional 
interest groups (including research and policy institutes, advocacy organizations, and teachers’ 
associations).39 I use an iterative coding process. First, I use two data sources to get a 
comprehensive list of national-level interest groups in the United States. The first is the 
Comparative Agendas Project compilation of all organizations in the Encyclopedia of 
 
38 I compiled a dataset of all ERIC articles from the XML files made available online (Institute of Education 
Sciences n.d.).  
 
39 The organizational types I categorized the organizations in are: state departments of education, local districts or 




Associations (EA) from 1970 to 2005.40 The second is the Washington Representatives (WR) 
dataset, compiled by Schlozman and colleagues (Anon n.d.; Schlozman, Brady, and Verba 
2012). I then search for matches between an institutional affiliation in ERIC and this list of 
interest groups.  
The second step in the coding process involves keyword searches of institutional 
affiliations in ERIC.41 This helps identify most government agencies, university affiliations, 
school districts, and teachers’ associations. Because using the EA and WR datasets in the first 
step and keyword searches in the second step require exact string matches to code organizations 
in ERIC, I use a text similarity technique in the third step of the coding process. Using the 
organizations that were successfully coded in the first two steps (e.g., classified as an interest 
group in the first step or, for example, a government agency or local school district in the second 
step), I create a “bag of words” for each organizational type. In other words, I create separate 
lists of words of all the names of organizations already classified as interest groups, state 
departments of education, etc.42 I then calculate the cosine similarity (Jurafsky and Martin 
2019:103–4) of each previously un-coded (from the first two steps) organization in ERIC to each 
 
40 The data for the EA organizations compiled by the Comparative Agendas Project can be found at 
https://www.comparativeagendas.net/us.  
 
41 I use the following keywords (in parentheses) for each organizational type: state departments of education (‘State 
Department of Education’, ‘Department of Public Instruction’, ‘Texas Education Agency’, ‘State Education 
Department’, local districts or schools (‘District’, ‘Public Schools’), institutes of higher education (‘University’, 
‘College’, ‘Institute of Technology’), research or policy institutes (‘Research’, ‘Policy’), and teachers’ associations 
(‘National Education Association’, ‘Federation of Teachers’, ‘AFL’, ‘Federation of Labor’, ‘Teachers Association’, 
‘Teachers Union’, ‘United Teachers’, ‘Association of Teachers’, ‘Teachers Education Association’, ‘Association of 
Classroom Teachers’, ‘Teacher Association’, ‘Teachers State Association’, ‘Council of Teachers’, ‘National 
Teachers Corps’). 
 
42 For example, the most common substantive words in the state departments of education “bag of words” are: 
Department, State, Education, Public, and Instruction. For interest groups from the EA or WR lists, the most 
common words are: Association, National, American, Education, Institute, Council, and Center. 
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bag of words.43 Each organization, therefore, then has a measure of how close its name is to each 
organizational type’s bag of words. Using these measures, I rank the cosine similarity measures 
and code previously un-coded organizations as belonging to an organizational type if the top 
category’s measure is 1) above a certain relative threshold, and 2) substantially larger than the 
measures of other categories.   
After this coding process, I exclude government agencies, local districts and schools, and 
university affiliations to focus only on education interest groups—advocacy organizations, 
policy and research institutes, and teachers’ associations. Of the original dataset (N=177,624), I 
now have 54,464 articles (31 percent of total articles) written by 6,699 unique interest groups (39 
percent of institutional affiliations). To capture organizations that were active in the leadup to 
IASA, I only include those that were in ERIC in the five years before the bill’s passage, 
providing me, for the final analysis, with 8,358 articles written by 1,703 unique organizations.  
To measure how much each of these articles discuss the two main paradigms in education 
policy, I calculate the concept distance of each article abstract to the two focal concepts: 
“equality” and “standards.” To ensure that these two concepts mirror the two main paradigms in 
the cross-policy domain analysis (equality and effectiveness), I also calculate the concept 
distance of each article to “effectiveness.” The association between the standards distance 
measure and effectiveness distance measure in the ERIC articles is high, with a Pearson 
correlation coefficient of 0.765.  
For my analyses, I include five measures that are proxies for organizational strength. For 
each of the 1,703 organizations, I calculate the total number of publications in ERIC since 1983 
(the year of A Nation at Risk’s publication) and the number of years the organization had, as of 
 
43 I validated this measure by calculating the median cosine similarity of each organizational type of organizations 
that were coded in the first two steps.   
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1994, been indexed in ERIC. I also calculate the average number of co-authors, average number 
of funding sponsors, and proportion of articles funded by the federal government for each 
organization since 1983.  
For the dependent variable in this analysis, I create a dummy variable of whether the 
organization testified at a Congressional hearing leading up to IASA’s adoption. To do so, I use 
both the Comparative Agendas Project Congressional hearings data and Proquest 
Congressional’s Legislative History. Starting with these two sources, I then excluded hearings 
that were only tangentially about the bill (e.g., hearings about school safety). This gave me a list 
of 20 hearings on the bill. Using Proquest Congressional, I obtained a list of all witnesses at 
these hearings. Of the 342 testimonies at these 20 hearings, I get the institutional affiliation of all 
witnesses and narrow down the list to only interest groups. An organization in the ERIC dataset 
gets a 1 if it is in this list and a 0 if it is not. 
Results 
I now turn to the results of my analysis, broken down into three sections. The first 
focuses on the cross-policy domain quantitative analyses. In this section, I present results from 
fixed effects (at the policy domain level) models of the determinants of significant legislative 
changes from 1973 to 1994. In the second section, I turn to the case of education policy and 
present quantitative evidence of how paradigm bridging by interest groups, in their research and 
reports, was positively associated with them testifying at Congressional hearings in the leadup to 
the passage of IASA in 1994. In the third and final section, I provide qualitative evidence of how 
paradigm bridging by interest groups in education was influential in shaping the Democratic 




Paradigms and Significant Legislation 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics, Public Laws (1973-1994)  
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max  
Social Policy Domains*       
Significant Legislation Mean Score 987 -1.18 0.81 -2.38 -1.55 1.70 
Bill Introduced by Member of Majority Party 987 0.92 0.27 0 1 1 
Number of Cosponsors 987 12.76 27.46 0 3 301 
Divided Government 987 0.76 0.39 0 1 1 
Concept Distance to "Effectiveness" 987 0.42 0.73 -2.98 0.49 2.61 
Concept Distance to "Equality" 987 0.33 0.70 -2.36 0.32 3.98 
Concept Above Yearly Median (Dummies) 987      
     Effectiveness 124 (12.6%)      
     Equality 207 (21.0%)      
     Both 482 (48.8%)      
     Neither 174 (17.6%)      
Non-Social Policy Domains       
Significant Legislation Mean Score 3,476 -1.40 0.68 -2.79 -1.71 1.14 
Bill Introduced by Member of Majority Party 3,476 0.85 0.35 0 1 1 
Number of Cosponsors 3,476 7.80 20.91 0 1 311 
Divided Government 3,476 0.77 0.39 0 1 1 
Concept Distance to "Effectiveness" 3,476 -0.02 0.77 -3.08 0.05 3.63 
Concept Distance to "Equality" 3,476 -0.29 0.68 -2.94 -0.29 3.33 
Concept Above Yearly Median (Dummies) 3,476      
     Effectiveness 681 (19.6%)      
     Equality 511 (14.7%)      
     Both 526 (15.1%)      
     Neither 1,758 (50.6%)       
* Social policy domains correspond to the following Comparative Agendas Project Major Topics: Macroeconomics; 
Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties; Health; Labor, Employment, and Immigration; Education; Law, 
Crime, and Family Issues; Social Welfare; and Community Development and Housing. 
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Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the analysis of the effects of the equality and 
effectiveness paradigms on the passage of major public laws from 1973 to 1994. The summary 
statistics are divided into two main categories of public laws: those that address social policy and 
those that do not. While the statistics vary slightly on some of the control variables, the most 
notable difference between the two categories is the degree to which laws engage with the two 
paradigms. In short, based on the concept distance measures, laws in social policy domains are 
much more likely to engage with either paradigm than non-social policy domains. Further, the 
dummy variable suggests that the highest category in social policy-related laws is “both” (a law 
that engages with both paradigms), while the highest category in non-social policy-related laws 
is “neither.” Given that the literature on the ascendancy of the effectiveness paradigm since the 
1970s discusses this rise in the context of domestic, social policy, the relatively high numbers of 





Table 4.2: Fixed Effects Models of Significant Laws, 1973-1994  
 Dependent variable:   
 Legislative Significance 
 Social Policy Domains Non-Social Policy Domains 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Bill Introduced by Member of Majority Party 0.25** 0.23** 0.23*** 0.20*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.03) (0.03)      
Number of Cosponsors 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)      
Divided Government 0.17** 0.16* -0.04 -0.02 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)      
Effectiveness Paradigm Only  0.29**  0.39*** 
  (0.09)  (0.03)      
Equality Paradigm Only  0.10  -0.01 
  (0.08)  (0.03)      
Both Effectiveness and Equality Paradigms  0.38***  0.19*** 
  (0.07)  (0.03)       
Policy Domain Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 987 987 3,476 3,476 
R2 0.08 0.12 0.04 0.08 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.08 
F Statistic 29.45*** 21.26*** 42.66*** 53.42***  
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
 Reference Category for Paradigm Variable is Neither 
Paradigm. 
I show results of the fixed effects models in table 2, breaking up the analysis into two 
subsets: the first using social policy laws and the second using all other laws. In model 1, I only 
include control variables. The results show that bills introduced by a member of the majority 
party in Congress, the number of bill cosponsors, and divided government are all positively 
associated with legislative significance. In model 2, I add the paradigm categorical variable, 
excluding “Neither Paradigm” as the reference category. The findings from this model first show 
that bills that focus mostly on equality are no more likely than bills that focus on neither equality 
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nor effectiveness to be considered significant pieces of legislation. Second, social policy bills 
that focus only on effectiveness are statistically more likely, at the 0.01 level, than the reference 
category to be significant laws. And third, social policy bills that focus on both paradigms are 
also more statistically likely, at the 0.001 level, to be significant laws. Most notably, the results 
show that social policy bills that focus on both paradigms are the most significant pieces of 
social policy legislation in this time period.  
Models 3 and 4 from table 2 mirror the analysis above, but are of non-social policy bills. 
The main difference between these models and the previous two, when it comes to the control 
variables, is that divided government is not associated with significant legislation in non-social 
policy bills. In terms of the effect of the focal independent variable, three results are worth 
noting. First, as with social policy bills, a focus only on equality is no more likely to yield a 
significant law than the reference category. Second, the effects of the effectiveness only 
paradigm and both paradigms categories are both again statistically associated with legislative 
significance, but the effects sizes, compared to social policy laws, are essentially flipped. In non-
social policy domains, a focus on effectiveness only is more likely to be associated with 
significant legislation. And third, when comparing the effects of paradigm bridging (the use of 
both paradigms) between social policy and non-social policy legislation, the effect is nearly 
double among social policy laws. This suggests that paradigm bridging is particularly significant 
in social policy. I return to these findings in the Discussion and Conclusions section. 
Changes in Education Policy 
Paradigm Bridging and the Passage of IASA 
 
 I now turn to the case of education policy to ask whether organizations that focused on 
both equality and standards (the latter highly associated both conceptually and empirically with 
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effectiveness) were more likely to be involved in the agenda-setting stage before the passage of 
IASA in 1994. Summary statistics of the analysis are provided in table 3. As shown in the table, 
only three percent of the 1,703 interest groups present in ERIC from 1990 to 1994 testified at a 
Congressional hearing related to IASA. The concept distance measures are worth noting for two 
main reasons. First, the mean of the standards measure (0.19) is higher than the mean of the 
equality measure (0.07), suggesting that, on average, interest groups in ERIC were focusing on 
the former more so than the latter. This is expected, given the rise of standards-based reform 
ideas in the 1970s and 1980s. Second, and counterintuitively, the mean proportion of an interest 
group’s articles in ERIC that engaged only with standards is considerably low (0.12) compared 
to the mean proportion of articles that engaged only with equality (0.27) and the mean proportion 
of articles that engaged with both (0.35). This suggests that, based on the concept distance 
measure, although standards were discussed substantially, interest groups, in a majority of 
articles in ERIC, discussed equality to some degree—often in tandem with a focus on standards.  
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics, Education Interest Groups (1983-1994)  
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max  
Witness at IASA-Related Hearing 1,703 0.03 0.16 0 0 1 
Number of ERIC Publications 1,703 9.85 26.93 1 2 612 
Average Number of Funding Sponsors 1,703 0.49 0.62 0 0.2 5 
Proportion Federal Government Sponsorship 1,703 0.14 0.31 0 0 1 
Average Number of Coauthors 1,703 0.32 0.57 0 0 6 
Years in ERIC 1,703 9.29 9.47 0 5 34 
Concept Distance to "Standards" 1,703 0.19 0.79 -3.15 0.22 4.04 
Concept Distance to "Equality" 1,703 0.07 0.71 -2.45 0.08 2.46 
Proportion of Publications Focused on Standards 1,703 0.12 0.26 0 0 1 
Proportion of Publications Focused on Equality 1,703 0.27 0.35 0 0.1 1 




Table 4.4: Logistic Regression Models of Interest Group Being a Witness at IASA-Related 
Congressional Hearing  
 Dependent variable:   
 Witness at IASA-Related Hearing 
 (1) (2) (3)  
Number of ERIC Publications 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)     
Average Number of Funding Sponsors -0.41 -0.40 -0.48 
 (0.39) (0.38) (0.39)     
Proportion Federal Government Sponsorship 0.54 0.60 0.61 
 (0.61) (0.61) (0.61)     
Average Number of Coauthors -0.08 -0.09 -0.13 
 (0.33) (0.33) (0.33)     
Years in ERIC 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)     
Proportion of Publications Focused on Standards  -1.22 -0.16 
  (0.98) (1.11)     
Proportion of Publications Focused on Equality  -0.16 0.83 
  (0.52) (0.74)     
Proportion of Publications Focused on Both   1.48* 
   (0.66)     
Constant -4.20*** -4.06*** -5.05*** 
 (0.31) (0.35) (0.62)      
Observations 1,703 1,703 1,703 
Log Likelihood -187.70 -186.72 -183.70 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 387.40 389.43 385.41  
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
 All Measures Post 1983 (Year of A Nation at 
Risk’s Publication) 
 Table 4 shows the results from the logistic regression. Model 1 includes only traditional 
measures of organizational strength, model 2 includes the proportion of an interest group’s 
engagement with one of the two main paradigms, and model 3 includes an organization’s 
engagement with both paradigms. The three models tell a consistent story. First, older 
organizations (as proxied by the years in ERIC measure) and more active organizations (as 
121 
 
proxied by the number of articles in ERIC) were more likely to have testified at a Congressional 
hearing related to IASA’s passage. The three other measures of organizational strength—funding 
sponsorship, federal government support, and coauthors—all have null effects on testifying. 
Turning to models 2 and 3, the main finding is that interest groups that focused on one paradigm 
or the other were not more likely to testify at an IASA hearing. On the other hand, paradigm 
bridging and testifying at an IASA hearing were positively associated, at the 0.05 level. Notably, 
interest groups that focused on both paradigms were more than four times as likely to testify at 
an IASA hearing.  
Insisting on Results: The Democratic Party’s Support for Standards 
 
The quantitative evidence above suggests that education interest groups, including policy 
institutes, advocacy organizations, and teachers’ associations, that were best at focusing on both 
equality and standards were more likely to influence policymaking in the leadup to IASA. 
Nonetheless, other factors contributed to the passage of IASA—including bipartisan consensus, 
slowly building between 1988 and 1994, on the broad contours of what education reform should 
look like. While Republicans were still wary of too much federal intervention in education and 
Democrats were concerned about budget cuts to education, both parties had come around to the 
idea that standards-based reforms were necessary. A push toward standards and, eventually, 
accountability aligned with conservative principles. In particular, it shifted the focus away from 
viewing education problems as stemming from underfunding and unequal access to resources. 
But it was the shift in the Democratic Party, despite some opposition from the National 
Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers—major Democratic 
supporters—that scholars have noted helps explain the passage of IASA in 1994.  
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The Democratic Party’s newfound support for standards-based reform can be found in 
changes to its party platform. In its 1988 platform, the party pledged, as it had more or less done 
since the 1960s, to “significantly [increase] federal funding for education… [and] ensure equal 
access by providing incentives and mechanisms for the equalization of financing…” (Democratic 
Party 1988). Four years later, the party still focused on equal access, saying “governments must 
end the inequalities that create educational ghettos among school districts and provide equal 
educational opportunity for all.” But, in a clear reversal from years past, it also said, “It’s not 
enough to spend more on our schools; we must insist on results,” adding that “school 
administrators must enforce discipline and high standards of educational attainment” 
(Democratic Party 1992; McGuinn 2006:79). These promises would translate into policy two 
years later in the form of IASA. 
Scholars have offered a number of explanations for Democratic support of standards-
based reforms in the 1990s. First, as measured by public opinion polls, Americans were, in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, increasingly concerned about education issues. Consequently, the 
1988 and 1992 elections represented important turning points in education policy. Both 
Republicans and Democrats wanted to position themselves as education reformers, and both 
parties’ leaders (especially George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton in 1992) were fending off 
criticism from more conservative and liberal wings, respectively, of their parties.  
A second and related explanation focuses on Clinton and his Third Way strategy. Clinton, 
as governor of Arkansas and as part of the coalition of Southern governors in the 1980s 
concerned with education, had implemented a number of standards-based reforms at the state 
level. His centrist position, in the 1992 campaign, was to convince voters that the government, 
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especially state governments, needed to play a role in education but that it had to be more than 
just through increased funding.  
A third explanation focuses on state governments, who had come to play a more 
prominent role in education policy in the late 1970s and 1980s—in terms of funding, setting 
standards, and administering assessments. It is no accident, then, that Clinton and his Secretary 
of Education, Richard Riley, another former Southern Democratic governor, would come to play 
an outsized role in Democrats’ push for both standards-based reforms and increased flexibility 
for states to administer those reforms. Further, interest groups involved in state policymaking, 
including the National Governors Association and the Council of Chief State School Officers, 
were increasingly influential players in education policy. 
While these three explanations each certainly shaped the Democratic Party’s shift and, 
consequently, the passage of IASA, I argue—based on the quantitative evidence above and 
qualitative evidence below—that the use of paradigm bridging by interest groups and broad 
coalitions were instrumental in pushing the Democratic party to support standards-based reform. 
Two reform campaigns of the early 1990s exemplify the diversity of organizations interested in 
some form of standards and assessments. The first is the Campaign for Genuine Accountability 
in Education, a group of educators, teachers’ unions, school administrators, and civil rights 
organizations (including the NAACP and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education 
Fund). In a statement published in 1991 against a national test to measure student progress, the 
Campaign argued that the Bush administration should instead “assist states and districts, acting 
in consortia, to develop and implement performance-based methods of assessment” and that 
education reform “must include restructuring curriculum, instruction, school governance, and 
assessment” (Campaign for Genuine Accountability in Education 1991). 
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Another coalition of interest groups interested in standards-based reform was the 
Commission on Chapter 1. Formed in 1990, the coalition was a 28-member group whose steering 
committee included representatives from the Business Roundtable, the Council of Chief State 
School Officers, and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund. The Commission 
published a report titled “Making Schools Work for Children in Poverty” in 1992 that would 
inform the Clinton team’s proposals two years later. The Commission’s first four 
recommendations were the following: 
“(1) Have states set clear, high standards for all students; (2) devise new systems for schools to 
assess progress toward standards; (3) inform parents about how well their children are 
progressing toward standards and how they can help; (4) invest heavily in teachers, principals, 
and other adults in schools so that all students meet standards” (Commission on Chapter 1 1992). 
That business groups, civil rights organizations, school administrators, and other interest 
groups were all pushing for standards and assessments is one part of the story. It was also that 
the use of standards was couched in language that was palpable to different constituencies, ones 
that had historically been wary that a focus on standards and quality would detract from a focus 
on equal access and low-income students. Even teachers’ unions, who were primarily concerned 
about teacher salaries and maintaining funding for public schools, tentatively supported 
standards and assessments. As early as 1983, James Ward, research director of the American 
Federation of Teachers, argued that an “emphasis on quality and standards in public schools” 
would have a “significant effect on increasing [teacher] quality” (Odden and Webb 1983). 
Most notably, for those concerned about equity in education, high standards and 
assessments had the potential to be equalizing rather than exacerbating inequality. Whereas the 
authors of A Nation at Risk argued that low standards were hurting all students, groups such as 
the Commission on Chapter 1 argued that Title I students had, for years, suffered “the effects of 
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low expectations” (Commission on Chapter 1 1992:40). Standards, the group argued, “should be 
the same in all schools, whether they serve rich or poor children” (Commission on Chapter 1 
1992:17). The Campaign for Genuine Accountability made a similar argument, saying that 
assessments can “provide information for accountability and assist the goal of equity” 
(Campaign for Genuine Accountability in Education 1991:14).  
Just as the initial push for standards and assessments in the early 1980s was aided by 
academic research, so were new arguments in the 1990s linking high standards with better 
outcomes for low-income students. Academics were not only part of the reform coalitions of the 
early 1990s, but their research was often used to justify the link between standards and better 
outcomes (McDonnell 2005:28). Quoting a widely cited book of the late 1980s, two researchers 
argued that the underlying logic that “all children can learn challenging content and complex 
problem solving skills” was supported by recent psychological research (O’Day and Smith 
1993:264). 
This evidence suggests that two concurrent factors were prevalent in the years leading up 
to the adoption of IASA. The first is that an increasing number, and diversity, of organizations 
began to focus their attention on standards and high quality education as being important factors 
in improving students’ academic achievement. But, second, both the quantitative and qualitative 
evidence suggest that, rather than this new focus on standards replacing the focus on equity, 
there was increasing attention to both standards and equity among interest groups. Consequently, 
it is unlikely that Clinton and Democratic leaders could have gained such strong support from 
Congressional Democrats and other liberal constituencies on standards in passing IASA (where 
98 percent of House Democrats and all Senate Democrats voted in favor of the bill) and, later, 
No Child Left Behind, without these two factors. 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
In this chapter, I focused on two questions. First, how much do policy ideas, and 
particularly paradigms, shape the policymaking process? And second, how does the framing of 
policy paradigms by collective actors effect legislative change? The results from the first set of 
analyses—which focused on the effects of paradigms on major legislative changes across policy 
domains in the United States from 1973 to 1994—suggest that laws that focused on both the 
equality and effectiveness paradigms were likely to be significant pieces of legislation. In all 
policy domains, laws that bridged these paradigms were more likely than laws that simply 
focused on equality to be significant. And in social policy domains, the effect of paradigm 
bridging was even more pronounced. Laws that bridged the two paradigms were the most 
likely—even more so than laws that only focused on effectiveness—to be significant pieces of 
legislation in this time period. 
The results from the quantitative analyses of education policy further confirm these 
findings but also more firmly suggest that policy ideas, independent of resources and traditional 
measures of power, have an effect on legislative change. Specifically, the findings show that 
organizations that focused their attention on both equality and standards were more likely than 
those that focused on one or the other to testify at Congressional hearings related to IASA. 
Further, while organizations that testified were well-established organizations (as denoted by the 
years in ERIC variable) and were active in producing research and reports (as denoted by the 
number of articles in ERIC variable), they were not, as some of the null findings show, the best 




Taken together, the results from these two sets of analyses provide support to recent 
critiques of the three strands of institutionalism that have typically explained institutional change 
with little attention to ideas (Mehta 2011; Schmidt 2010). My findings also suggest that political 
power of organizations (in this case, the power to set the policy agenda and effect legislative 
change) is often derived not from material resources or support but from ideas. I show that this is 
especially true when ideas are bridged, which suggests, from social movement studies, that frame 
articulation is more effective than frame elaboration in creating social and political change 
(Snow et al. 2013).  
This chapter also provides insights into the legislative changes in education policy in the 
United States. While much has been written about No Child Left Behind, I focus on IASA—an 
important precursor to NCLB—at a time when politicians and policymakers (the early to mid 
1990s) were increasingly paying attention to reform discussions around education. Reinforcing 
the argument that paradigm bridging plays an important role in both agenda setting and 
legislative change, the findings from both the quantitative and qualitative analyses of the case 
suggest that there was not a clean break among education reformers and policymakers from a 
focus on equality to a focus on standards and accountability. Instead, the organizations that 
played a significant role in the policy process were instead arguing that high standards and 
accountability were needed for the sake of equality (McDermott 2011).  
The findings from the case also shed light on how new paradigms eventually lead to 
political and policy changes (Mehta 2013a). Education scholars often peg the start of the 
standards paradigm to the early 1980s and, in particular, the publication of A Nation at Risk in 
1983. How did the publication of this report (and many others) eventually lead to the passage of 
IASA in 1994? I argue that, in particular, the publication of A Nation at Risk, rather than 
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elevating one group of actors, did the opposite. It brought into the fold a large number of 
organizations, and different kinds of organizations, into the discussion of standards and quality 
education. Rather than restricting the study and discussion of academic achievement in education 
to a closed off group of actors, it opened it up. The result was an opportunity for education 
reformers and interest groups to bridge the equality paradigm that had been dominant since the 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, I addressed three questions that each shed light on the policymaking 
process, especially in the United States. First, I asked how new policy paradigms—underlying 
assumptions that drive policy prescriptions and solutions—emerge and, specifically what role 
governments and academics play in shaping that emergence. Second, I focused on four sets of 
determinants (resource mobilization, policy-related and political attention, partisanship, and issue 
salience) of interest group growth in the United States. And third, I asked how policy paradigms 
and the interest groups that communicate them eventually lead to major legislative changes. 
Framing these questions in the context of education policy in the U.S. from the mid 1960s to the 
mid 1990s allowed me to address these three questions in a way that both explains different 
stages of the policymaking process and provides new insights on the case of education policy 
itself. I now briefly summarize each of the chapters’ main findings and then say how they, taken 
together, tell us more about American policymaking in the last half of the 20th century.  
In chapter 2, I explain how, in a relatively short time period, the discussion among 
education reformers and policymakers shifted from a focus on the need for equitable access to a 
need for high academic standards and better quality education. I show that the emergence of the 
latter paradigm came about as a result of a two-stage process that began in the 1960s (Berman 
2013). In the first stage, demand for new ideas was fueled by both the federal government and 
academics. Policies from the 1960s and early 1970s created what I argue were negative feedback 
effects (Béland, Rocco, and Waddan 2019; Jacobs and Weaver 2015). Specifically, the 
government increasingly funded applied research in an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of
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implemented policies, and this kind of evaluation was especially prominent in education. 
Academics also spurred the demand for new ideas, doing so because of their dissatisfaction with 
the existing paradigm. A number of prominent academics argued against the view that students’ 
socioeconomic status was the main determinate of their academic achievement and argued that 
more research was needed on which characteristics of schools best improved student outcomes. 
The second stage of the two-stage process—an increase in the supply of ideas—was also 
driven by academics and the federal government. Academics, starting in the 1970s and early 
1980s, were increasingly studying school interventions—topics such as educational psychology, 
curriculum and instruction, teaching methods, and assessments—more so than topics such as 
socioeconomic conditions, desegregation, and school financing. Two factors drove this change. 
First, graduate programs and academic journals provided more opportunities for the study of 
school interventions. And, second, federal education agencies in the 1970s and early 1980s were 
more likely to fund research on school intervention topics. 
In chapter 3, I find that three factors best explain interest group growth in the United 
States in the last three decades of the 20th century. The first is the presence of resources, both 
material (in the form of foundations and similar organizations) and political (in the form of 
government-related and administrative organizations). The second is attention from Congress, in 
the form of Congressional hearings, confirming previous work on the effect of agenda-setting 
attention on mobilization. And the third is political partisanship—how far apart the two main 
political parties are on the issues. More specifically related to this third factor, I find that a 
combination of a highly partisan environment and one in which one party is more dominant 
drives interest group growth.  
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In chapter 4, the quantitative and qualitative evidence suggest that interest groups that 
were best at paradigm bridging—combining elements of two competing, separate paradigms—
were more likely to have access to the agenda-setting stage in education policy in the leadup to 
the passage of IASA in 1994. Consequently, IASA had elements of the two dominant paradigms 
in education policy—equality and standards—when it passed. In this chapter, I also find that 
significant laws, such as IASA, from the early 1970s to the mid 1990s were more likely than 
non-significant laws to bridge two dominant paradigms in American politics—equality and 
effectiveness. In social policy domains, the effect of paradigm bridging was even more 
pronounced. 
The findings from chapter 4 mainly challenge the notion that institutional (including 
policy) change and political power are derived exclusively from material interests. Instead, 
change often comes about from the power of ideas themselves, and the political power of 
organizations (in this case, the power to set the policy agenda and effect legislative change) is 
often derived from those ideas (Mehta 2011; Schmidt 2010; Weber 1915). This is especially true 
when policy ideas (including paradigms and frames) are bridged in ways that make them 
appealing to different stakeholders, including government officials, legislators, and the public.  
The findings of this dissertation, taken together, contribute, most significantly, to 
scholars’ understanding of the role of ideas in politics and policymaking. Taking a historical 
perspective spanning three decades, I find that many previous explanations of what drives new 
policy ideas—exogenous events, crises, powerful interest groups, and political elites—are 
inadequate. More specifically, the evidence I present suggests that the demand and supply of new 
ideas, in the late 1960s and 1970s, was not driven by powerful interests, partisan think tanks, or 
politicians. Instead, I find that policies, government agencies, and academics contributed to 
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changing policy ideas. In the case of education, those policy ideas shaped the new standards 
paradigm of the early 1980s.  
While I argue that powerful interest groups and politicians played a smaller role than 
expected in the emergence of the new paradigm, I do show, in chapter 4, how interest groups 
(and politicians) communicated new ideas in ways that bridged seemingly contradictory 
paradigms—equality and effectiveness—that led to major policy changes. This largely confirms 
policy historians’ work on how “institutionalized entrepreneurs” often compromise on issues and 
join diverse governing coalitions—ones that include not just interest groups, but government 
bureaucrats and legislators—to effect policy change (Grossmann 2014:182–84).  
My findings also lend support to much of the literature on policy feedback, showing how 
the policies and decisions of the 1960s set in motion a number of processes that led to the major 
policy changes of the 1990s and early 2000s. But because those early policies and decisions 
ultimately led not to a wholesale entrenchment of the equality-focused paradigm of the 1960s but 
to a major revision of it, I argue that this constitutes an example not of positive feedback but of 
negative feedback.  
Finally, while much has been written about the standards and accountability paradigm in 
education, the synthetic approach I take in my dissertation provides new insights on this case. 
First, it locates the emergence of the new policy paradigm earlier than many accounts by 
showing that, while much action on standards and accountability was occurring at the state level, 
federal policymakers and interest groups were, in the 1970s, setting the stage, at least in policy 
discussions, for more standards and accountability (Mehta 2013). Second, I show that this push 
was not simply driven by business reform groups, those concerned about the economic 
competitiveness of American students, and conservative think tanks. Rather, many in the field of 
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education became more convinced of the role that schools and teachers had on student 
performance and of the need to measure those outcomes. Third, and relatedly, I argue that the 
new paradigm relied, in large part, on the large expansion of academic studies of student 
performance. This was driven, I show, by two factors: 1) the increasing availability of funding 
from the federal government for education research, and 2) the increasing academic debates of 
the 1970s and early 1980s about the effectiveness of families, school environments, and teachers 
on student achievement. 
I also focus on the factors that led to the passage of IASA, passed in 1994—an important 
precursor to No Child Left Behind. The early to mid 1990s were a time when politicians and 
policymakers were increasingly paying attention to reform discussions around education—in part 
due to the public’s newfound concerns—starting in the mid to late 1980s—about education as an 
important policy priority (Brodinsky and Elam 1989; McGuinn 2006). Reinforcing the argument 
that paradigm bridging plays an important role in both agenda setting and legislative change, the 
findings from my dissertation suggest that there was not a clean break among education 
reformers and policymakers from a focus on equality to a focus on standards and accountability. 
Instead, education reformers were arguing that high standards and accountability were needed 
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Appendix 2.1. Subject Indexes from the Education Resources Information Center Database 
Used to Classify Publications 
 
Access Paradigm Quality Paradigm 
Access to Education Academic Standards 
Black Achievement Back to Basics 
Black Students Comparative Education 
Blacks Competency Based Education 
Community Core Curriculum 
Disadvantaged Educational Assessment 
Disadvantaged Environment Educational Improvement 
Disadvantaged Youth Educational Needs 
Economically Disadvantaged Educational Quality 
Educationally Disadvantaged Futures (of Society) 
Equal Education High School Graduates 
Ethnic Groups Low Achievement 
Family National Programs 
Minority Group Children Outcomes of Education 
Minority Groups Relevance (Education) 
Negroes School Effectiveness 
Segregation Teacher Education 
Social Environment Technological Literacy 
Socioeconomic Time Factors (Learning) 






Appendix 2.2. Topic Modeling 
 
Topic modeling is used to identify the latent thematic structure of a group of texts based 
on the co-occurrence of words. In this case, these models estimate the thematic structure that 
underlies the descriptions of articles, focused on academic achievement, indexed in ERIC. To 
estimate these models, a researcher needs to specify the number of topics (K) that the words of 
the body of documents, based on co-occurrence, will be classified into. In addition to estimating 
this underlying thematic structure, the topic models estimate the proportion of each document 
that is dominated by the topics, the word sets that constitute each topic, and a measure of the 
exclusivity and frequency with which a word w is identified with a specific topic. 
Having to specify the number of topics (K) means that the estimates above are based on a 
subjective and difficult to replicate process. To address this, I run seven models (with topic 
numbers ranging from 8 to 20). I evaluate each model based on four diagnostic measures: 
semantic coherence (words in a topic frequently co-occur together in documents), exclusivity 
(how exclusive words are to a topic), residuals, and the likelihood the model will accurately 
predict held-out documents (Mimno et al. 2011; Taddy 2012; Wallach et al. 2009). The goal is to 
maximize coherence, exclusivity, and heldout likelihood, while minimizing the residuals. The 









Figure A2.2. Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity of Three Best Models 
 
In addition to these diagnostic measures, I run multiple models, with different topic 
numbers, for two other reasons. First, reading through the most frequent and most exclusive 
words of topics across models allows me to validate that observing the latent topics from the 
documents is not a function of the number of topics. And second, it allows me to run regressions 
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using multiple models, another validation strategy that allows me to see whether the effect of my 
main covariate is consistent across the models. 
Below, I include the top 10 words of each of the topics in the three best models 
(K=10,12,14). I name the topics based on my reading not just of the top 10 words, but also the 
most exclusive words (not shown). The topics in each of the three models show a lot of 
consistency. To supplement figure 13 in the main text, which shows the topic proportions of the 
best model (K=12), I include topic proportions for the other two models. Finally, I supplement 
figure 14 in the main text, which shows regressions results from the best model, with regression 
results of the other two models.  
 
 
Table A2.1. Top 10 Words in Each Topic, Best Model (K=12) 
 






















social teachers data school children students evaluation test self program 
children teacher family schools grade science student data variables programs 
child student rural students group course system tests school evaluation 
class students age high reading performance section scores relationship project 
development classroom income student groups mathematics objectives results concept students 
parents learning population public test level assessment used ability language 
role teaching years district year college model analysis students title 
factors behavior status elementary first materials information students high school 
school time occupational city school high development grade related english 
























children students rural school grade students system data self program information teachers 
social group family schools test science evaluation variables ability programs data teacher 
parents groups age students reading performance problems analysis concept evaluation presented student 
child experimental income high children mathematics learning used high project section classroom 
class control population public scores course performance test students students assessment teaching 
school classes years district year student programs measures low title results behavior 
home instruction data student tests college goals model relationship language procedures learning 
environment two american elementary first level model results school development included time 
development learning status districts grades objectives discussed scores differences staff tables students 




























social group children school grade students model data self program test teacher rural school 
role groups status schools reading science problems assessment students programs scores teachers population high 
literature experimental socioeconomic students students materials system results concept evaluation measures student income students 
learning control black public language course learning information attitudes project tests classroom age college 
factors two class student mathematics instruction process national ability development children teaching years vocational 
discusses children variables district skills level performance used low title cognitive learning indian disadvantaged 
examines classes data elementary grades performance development procedures high staff variables behavior data junior 
cultural significant parents city english student discussed presented school services performance time women success 
article students child desegregation year two based testing differences activities intelligence students states work 




Figure A2.3. Topic Proportions, Model with K=10 
Figure 





Figure A2.5. Effect of Federal Sponsorship on Topic Proportions, Model with K=10 
 
 
Figure A2.6. Effect of Federal Sponsorship on Topic Proportions, Model with K=14 
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